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PUBLIC IMPORTANCE: BALANCING 
PROPRIETARY INTERESTS AND 
THE RIGHT TO KNOW 
ERIC B. EASTON* 
The extension of the New York Times test proposed by the Rosen-
bloom plurality would ... [force] state and federal judges to de-
cide on an ad hoc basis which publications address issues of 
"general or public interest" and which do not-to determine, in 
the words of Mr. Justice Marshall, "what information is relevant 
to self-government." 1 We doubt the wisdom of committing this 
task to the conscience of judges. 
-Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 346 (1974). 
The enforcement of that provision in this case, however, impli-
cates the core purposes of the First Amendment because it im-
poses sanctions on the publication of truthful information of 
public concern. In this case, privacy concerns give way when 
balanced against the interest in publishing matters of public im-
portance. As Warren and Brandeis stated in their classic law re-
view article: "The right of privacy does not prohibit any 
publication of matter which is of public or general interest."2 
-Barlnicki v. Vopper, 121 S.Ct. 1764-65 (2001). 
INTRODUCTION 
Articulating a coherent, all-encompassing First Amendment 
doctrine for freedom of speech and of the press has so far eluded 
every scholar who has tried, not least because of the variety of ana-
lytical approaches and potentially dispositive factors in Supreme 
Courtjurisprudence.3 For example, the same regulation might be 
* Associate Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law. B.S. Northwestern Uni-
versity, 1968; J.D., University of Maryland School of Law, 1989. I wish to thank my col-
leagues Michael Meyerson and Robert Lande for their generous assistance and inspiration. 
Whatever errors may be found in this article undoubtedly result from my disregarding 
their sage advice. 
1 Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 79 (1971). 
2 Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193, 214 
(1890). 
3 See, e.g., Harry Kalven,Jr., A WoRTHY TRADITION 3 (1988) ("The Court has not fash-
ioned a single, general theory which would explain all of its [freedom of speech) decisions; 
rather, it has floated different principles for different problems."); Rodney A. Smolla, FREE 
SPEECH IN AN OPEN SociETY 18 (1992) ("[M)odern First Amendment problems present an 
intricate maze of competing philosophies, sharp social conflicts and complicated legal doc-
139 
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enforceable in one medium, but not another;4 in one forum, but 
not another.5 Enforceability may depend on the regulator's pur-
pose and drafting skill, or not/' depending in turn on whether the 
speech deserves full protection, 7 some protection,!:~ or no protec-
tion at allY Sometimes enforceability depends on the speaker's in-
tent,10 or knowledge, 11 or care 12 ... or none of those factors. 13 
Sometimes it depends on the speaker's status 14 or access to alterna-
tive communication channels; 15 sometimes it depends on the status 
trines .... The modern student of free speech will quickly be tempted to abandon the 
search for general organizing principles .... "); STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, 
DEMOCRACY AND RoMANCE 2-3 (1993) ("First amendment law now is, if nothing else, a com-
plex set of compromises .... a committee product. ... To formulate an organizing vision 
for the first amendment is to risk detachment from social reality."). 
4 Compare Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (state law requiring newspa-
pers to provide space for political candidates to reply to adverse editorials violated First 
Amendment freedom of the press), with Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) 
(federal policy requiring broadcasters to provide time for political candidates to reply to 
adverse editorials did not violate First Amendment freedom of the press). 
5 Compare Madison Jt. Sch. Dist. v. Wis. Empl. Rei. Commn., 429. U.S. 167 (1976) 
(school district would violate nonunion teacher's First Amendment right of free speech by 
prohibiting him from speaking on collective bargaining negotiations at a public board of 
education meeting), with Perry Educ. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37 
(1983) (school district did not violate the First Amendment by permitting teachers' exclu-
sive bargaining representative access to the inter-school mail system but denying such ac-
cess to a rival teacher group). 
fi See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC [Turner I], 512 U.S. 622, 642-43 (1994) ("But 
while a content-based purpose may be sufficient in certain circumstances to show that a 
regulation is content-based, it is not necessary to such a showing in all cases. Nor will the 
mere assertion of a content-neutral purpose be enough to save a law which, on its face, 
discriminates based on content." (citations omitted)). 
7 See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 875 (1997) (governmental interest in protect-
ing children from harmful materials does not justifY an unnecessarily broad suppression of 
speech meant for adults). 
8 See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 560, 567 (1991) (state public indecency 
statute is constitutional despite its incidental limitations on some expressive activity). 
9 See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) ("This much has been categori-
cally settled by the Court, that obscene material is unprotected by the First Amendment."). 10 See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) ("[T]he constitutional guar-
antees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy 
of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or 
producing imminent lawless action .... "). 
II See, e.g., Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 153-55 (1959) (absent a scienter require-
ment, an ordinance holding a bookseller criminally liable for stocking an obscene book is 
unconstitutional). 
I2 See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (requiring a public 
official plaintiff to show that a libel defendant acted with actual malice, that is knowledge 
of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth). 
13 See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media, 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991) (generally applicable laws 
do not offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press 
has incidental effect~ on it~ ability to gather and report the news). 14 See, e.g., Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 314-16 (1973) (members of Congress and 
their staffs held immune from libel action for ordering or voting for a publication going 
beyond the reasonable requirements of the legislative function, but not those legislative 
functionaries involved in the publishing or distribution of otherwise actionable materials). 
15 See, e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 ( 1984) 
(government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of pro-
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or access of one who objects to the speaker's speech. 16 
In any given case, the analysis may begin with the speaker or 
the speech, with the regulator or the regulator's putative benefici-
ary. Although difficult and inconsistent, these analyses are reason-
ably well-established. Soll1e questions remain unresolved, and new 
media-like the Internet-send lawyers scrambling to find appro-
priate analogs, judges to select among them, and law professors to 
second-guess judges. 17 But, in general, the cases tell us what rules 
to apply, if not exactly how to apply them. 
In a handful of cases, however, the analysis focuses on the 
speaker's audience-the listener or reader or public in general. 
Because the rights of the listener are poorly defined, and the 
power of the public vigorously disputed, 18 consistency is even 
harder to find in these cases. This article endeavors to bring some 
coherence to this body of law by identifying its source and survey-
ing its contemporary application. Simply stated, this article argues 
that the First Amendment's penumbral "right to know" is the 
source of a "public importance test" that the Supreme Court has 
reluctantly, but ineluctably, adopted to help mediate between the 
proprietary claims of private citizens and the reportorial impera-
tives of the press. It goes on to suggest that, properly applied, this 
public importance test has significant implications for freeing pro-
prietary information, whether held by government or private enti-
ties. It concludes that several areas of law generally thought to be 
exempt from constitutional analysis-newsgathering torts, free-
dom of information statutes, and especially copyright law-must 
be reexamined in light of this test. 
Few of the corollary principles that grow out of the First 
Amendment have inspired more thoughtful scholarship and im-
passioned debate than the notion that an implicit right to know 
tected speech, provided the restrictions .. .leave open ample alternative channels for com-
munication of the information). 
16 See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974) (setting a lower consti-
tutional fault standard for libel plaintiffs who are private individuals than for public official 
or public figures). 
17 Compare Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (treating 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) as "distributors," rather than "publishers" of libelous ma-
terial), with Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1995 (N.Y. 
Sup. May 24, 1995) (treating ISPs as publishers under similar circumstances). See also 
Michael I. Meyerson, Authors, Editors, and Uncommon Carriers: Identifying the "Speaker" Within 
the New Media, 71 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 79, 123 (1995) (urging that ISP liability be limited to 
those instances where the ISP had a high degree of involvement in the offending speech). 
This issue was resolved by Congress in the Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. 
§ 230, which immunized ISPs from publisher liability. See Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 
129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997). 
18 See infra text accompanying notes 111-43. 
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accompanies the explicit right to speak. In Part I of this article, I 
suggest that the right to receive information (a more precise, if 
rather awkward, formulation than "right to know") holds a long-
standing and positive place in First Amendment jurisprudence as 
an indispensable complement to the right to speak. 19 
Yet, as Part II demonstrates, some scholars believe that the 
right to know precedes, explains, and justifies the right to speak, 
and therefore invites or even requires government intervention to 
temper the right to speak where necessary to serve the public de-
bate.20 Others, seeing this connection as a dangerous, ideologi-
cally motivated infringement on free speech and press, deny the 
very existence of a right to know. 21 Still others, uncomfortable with 
the implications of a strong right to know, but unable to ·deny its 
existence, would enforce the right pragmatically against some 
kinds of speech or some kinds of media. 22 
In Part III, I assert that the right to know, like the right to 
speak itself, is a right that individuals may exercise solely against 
their government. In particular, it cannot be used to bootstrap di-
rect government regulation of media content when a broader pub-
lic interest in "uninhibited, robust and wide-open" debate23 
appears threatened by private actions.24 
Government intervention may be necessary to preserve the 
"marketplace of ideas"2 fi by limiting structural concentration in the 
media industry, and proper application of the right to know can 
support that purpose,26 but the First Amendment stands as a bar to 
any government intervention that prohibits or compels private 
speech. 
Having determined what the right to know is not, Part IV iden-
tifies the "public importance test" as a manifestation of the public's 
right to know and surveys applications of the test in libel and pri-
vacy cases from New York Times v. Sullivan27 to Bartnicki v. Vopper. 28 
19 See infra text accompanying notes 38-110. 
20 See infra text accompanying notes 125-31. 
21 See infra text accompanying notes 116-24. 
22 See infra text accompanying notes 132-43. 
23 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
24 See infra text accompanying notes 144-68. 
2fi See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) ("It is the purpose of the 
First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ulti-
mately prevail. ... "); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes,]., dis-
senting) ("[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the 
competition of the market. ... "). 
26 See infra text accompanying notes 169-71. 
27 376 u.s. 254 (1964). 
28 532 u.s. 514 (2001). 
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The test is sometimes called "public interest,"29 sometimes "legiti-
mate public concern,"30 and sometimes "newsworthiness."31 As a 
constitutional fact, the importance of information can bar govern-
ment suppression of speech and perhaps even discourage punish-
ment when reporters have compromised their own interests 
through tortious or criminal acts. 32 
Then again, speech is sometimes suppressed or punishment 
meted out whether the speech is important or not. Predictability 
remains elusive, especially in newsgathering, access to public 
records, and copyright. In Part V, I urge the vigorous application 
of a public importance test in these areas, which might be charac-
terized as "unwilling speaker" cases. 33 Far from being merely a 
"dangerous slogan,"34 or a post-modern construct designed to 
thwart the libertarian view of the First Amendment, the right to 
know, manifested in this way, offers new support for expanding the 
amount of information in the public domain.35 
Part VI raises two cautionary notes: (1) that deference to pro-
prietary rights such as personal privacy, government secrecy, and 
copyright may be necessary, as a practical matter, to preserve core 
freedoms of speech and publishing,36 and (2) that investing in 
courts the power to determine the public importance undermines 
both the political branches and the independent judgment of jour-
nalists.37 Nevertheless, I conclude that, once the courts accept the 
notion that a First Amendment right to know prevents Congress 
29 I use the term "public importance" to avoid the confusion inherent in the term "pub-
lic interest." One dictionary offers two definitions of public interest: "1. the welfare or well-
being of the general public; commonwealth: health programs that directly affect the public inter-
est. 2. appeal or relevance to the general populace: a news story of public interest." Random 
House Unabridged Dictionary 1563 (2d ed. 1993) (emphasis in original). In this article, I am 
primarily concerned with the latter, and while "public interest" appears far more fre-
quently in the literature, using "public importance" better preserves the distinction be-
tween the two meanings. 
30 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 571-72 (1968) ("the question whether a 
school system requires additional funds is a matter of legitimate public concern on 
which .... free and open debate is vital to informed decision-making by the electorate"). 
See also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983) (quoting "legitimate public concern" 
standard from Pickering). 
31 Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73 n.9 (1964) (noting that the law of privacy 
recognizes severe limitations where public figures or newsworthy facts are concerned). 
32 See infra text accompanying notes 172-244. 
33 It is often said, in a disparaging tone, that if the "right to know" exists at all, it merely 
protects from unwarranted government interference the right of a willing listener to hear a 
willing speaker. In the case of newsgathering, access to government information, and cop-
yright, however, I argue that the right to know can and should be asserted against govern-
ment to pry information from unwilling speakers. 
34 Lucas A. Powe, Jr., THE FouRTH EsTATE AND THE CoNsTITUTION 257 (1992). 
35 See infra text accompanying notes 245-341. 
36 See infra text accompanying notes 341-47. 
37 See infra text accompanying notes 348-50. 
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from having a free hand in restricting the flow of information, the 
courts themselves will find the proper balance the way they always 
do, one difficult case at a time. In any event, there is no reasonable 
alternative. 
I. THE RIGHT TO KNow 
Although Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC~8 is generally consid-
ered the preeminent "right to know" case, the concept goes back 
much further in First Amendment jurisprudence.~9 Even before 
the First Amendment's right to speak was formally incorporated 
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
apply to state law,40 the U.S. Supreme Court in Meyer v. Nebraska41 
averred that the right to receive information was itself protected as 
a "liberty interest" by that same Clause.42 Striking down Nebraska's 
World War I-era ban on teaching children to read in German or 
other foreign languages, the Court found that the concept of lib-
erty "[w]ithout doubt" includes "the right of the individual . .. to 
acquire useful knowledge."4~ Moreover, the Court said, 
this liberty may not be interfered with, under the guise of protecting 
the public interest, by legislative action which is arbitrary or with-
out some reasonable relation to some purpose within the com-
petency of the state to effect. . . . The American people have 
always regarded education and acquisition of knowledge as matters 
of supreme importance, which should be diligently promoted. 44 
In Meyer, the relationship between the right to know and the 
right to speak was symbiotic. Although it is possible to see Meyer as 
turning exclusively on the teacher's right to speak, the better view 
is that the reversal of Meyer's conviction vindicates both aspects of 
this liberty interest.45 
38 395 u.s. 367 (1969). 
39 See Wilfrid C. Rumble, student author, The FCC's Reliance on Market Incentives to Provide 
Diverse Viewpoints on Issues of Public Importance Violates the First Amendment's Right to Receive 
Critical Information, 28 U.S.F.L. REv. 793 (1994). Although I obviously disagree with this 
Comment's thesis, its author has done an admirable job in assembling the important cases. 
4° SeeGitlowv. NewYork, 268 U.S. 652,666 (1925). 
41 262 u.s. 390 (1923). 
42 /d. at 399 (1923); see also Pierce v. Society of Sisters of Holy Names, 268 U.S. 510, 534-
35 (1925) (holding that the liberty interest protects the right of parents to educate their 
children in private schools). 
43 /d. (emphasis added). 
44 !d. at 399-400 (emphasis added). 
45 The Meyer Court does not explicitly address whether the teacher had standing to 
raise the student's right to receive the German language training. But a later case, Griswold 
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965), not only settles the issue in favor of the speaker's 
standing to raise the constitutional rights of the listener, it even cites Meyer as a case in 
which this was done. /d. Griswold's value to this discussion is somewhat limited by the fact 
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Nearly twenty years later, long after incorporation, the Court 
reaffirmed the right to receive information in Martin v. City of 
Struthers, 46 which struck down a local ordinance barring door-to-
door distribution of handbills, circulars, or other advertisementsY 
Again, the Court enlisted "the right of the individual householder" 
to receive the information in support of the convicted distributor's 
right to distribute it.48 
The right of freedom of speech and press has broad scope. 
The authors of the First Amendment knew that novel and uncon-
ventional ideas might disturb the complacent, but they chose to 
encourage a freedom which they believed essential if vigorous en-
lightenment was ever to triumph over slothful ignorance (footnote 
omitted). This freedom embraces the right to distribute literature, 
Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938), and necessarily protects the 
right to receive it. 49 
As in Meyer, the Court saw no need to state with specificity 
whether Martin would have prevailed solely on the ground of her 
right to speak, without reference to anyone's right to receive infor-
mation.50 Both opinions also took the measure of the counter-
vailing government interests, easily finding them inferior, but 
neither laid down any rigorous criteria for the balancing test. 51 
Other contemporaneous cases also spoke to the right to re-
ceive information,52 but it was not until 1965 that the Court finally 
that, ultimately, the holding turned on the unconstitutionality of state prohibition on con-
traception as an invasion of privacy, rather than merely the right to receive information 
about contraception. Still, as suggested below, the·relationship between privacy and the 
right to receive information is not without relevance. See infra text accompanying notes 
201-244. 
46 319 u.s. 141 (1943). 
47 See id. at 143. 
48 /d. (emphasis added). 
49 /d. (emphasis added). 
50 The Court's citation to Lovell v. Griffin, another Jehovah's Witnesses case, is curious. 
In Lovell, a municipal ordinance barring distribution of handbills without a license was 
struck down without reference to the right to receive information. Presumably, the same 
rationale would be available to Martin. But the Court's sentence structure would seem to 
suggest that the right to receive information stands alone. 
51 See Meyer, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923) ("No emergency has arisen which renders knowl-
edge by a child of some language other than English so clearly harmful as to justify its 
inhibition with the consequent infringement of rights long freely enjoyed."), and Martin, 
319 U.S. at 147 ("The dangers of distribution can so easily be controlled by traditional legal 
methods, leaving to each householder the full right to decide whether he will receive.stran-
gers as visitors, that stringent prohibition can serve no purpose but that forbidden by the 
Constitution, the naked restriction of the dissemination of ideas.") The language from 
Meyer quoted in the text might suggest a modem "rational basis" test, but the better inter-
pretation would be that, having found that the statute failed even that minimal test, 262 
U.S. at 403, the Court had no need to look further. 
52 See, e.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 534 (1945) (reversing the conviction of a 
union organizer for speaking to a group of workers without the required state license, on 
ground that the license requirement imposed an unconstitutional "restriction upon 
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confronted a pair of cases that placed the right to receive before 
the Court without a corresponding right to speak. Both cases pit 
the appellants' right to receive information against the govern-
ment's asserted national security interest. 
In Zemel v. Rusk,5~ the Court upheld the State Department's 
refusal to validate a private citizen's passport for travel to Cuba "to 
satisfy [his] curiosity about the state of affairs in Cuba and to make 
[him] a better informed citizen."54 The Court denied that Zemel's 
First Amendment rights were implicated by the government's ac-
tion, distinguishing earlier cases reversing passport denials by the 
absence of any asserted interest in expression or association.55 The 
Court conceded that the government's action "renders less than 
wholly free the flow of information concerning [Cuba]," but saw 
that as a "factor to be considered in determining whether [Zemel] 
had been denied due process of law.''56 
The Court read the government's action as a restriction on 
Zemel's right to act, not his right to receive information.57 Indeed, 
the Court's only reference to such a right was even less than lip 
service: "The right to speak and publish does not carry with it the 
unrestrained right to gather information.''5H 
Two weeks later, the Court issued a dramatically different 
opinion. In Lamont v. Postmaster General, 59 the Court struck down a 
federal statute requiring a request in writing as a prerequisite to 
the delivery of nonsealed mail from abroad containing Communist 
propaganda material. In a very brief and narrow opinion, Justice 
Douglas held the requirement an "unconstitutional abridgment of 
the addressee's First Amendment rights."Go While he did not say 
precisely which First Amendment right was implicated, the right to 
receive information is the only logical possibility.61 Justice Brennan 
Thomas' right to speak and the rights of the workers to hear what he had to say .... ") and 
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 508-9 (1946) (reversing the conviction of a Jehovah's 
Witness for distributing literature on the sidewalks of a company-owned town, on ground 
that the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit censorship of the information the 
residents of the town need to be properly informed, good citizens). 
53 381 u.s. 1 (1965). 
5 4 !d. at 4. 
55 See id. at 16 (distinguishing Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 ( 1958), and AfJtheker v. Secre-
tary of Stale, 378 U.S. 500 (1964)). 
56 See Zemel, 381 U.S. at 16. 
57 See id. (emphasis added). 
58 lrl. at 17 (emphasis added). 
59 381 u.s. 301 (1965). 
60 !d. at 307. 
61 It might seem as though Lamont's right to refrain from compelled speech is also 
implicated by the requirement for a written request. But there would be no compulsion 
issue unless Lamont wanted to receive mail that was withheld because of its political con-
tent, in this case, the Peking Review. lrl. at 304. Signing for routinely undeliverable mail has 
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spells it out in a concurring opinion: 
It is true that the First Amendment contains no specific guaran-
tee of access to publications. However, the protection of the Bill 
of Rights goes beyond the specific guarantees to protect from 
congressional abridgment those equally fundamental personal 
rights necessary to make the express guarantees fully meaning-
ful (citations omitted). I think the right to receive publications 
is such a fundamental right. The dissemination of ideas can ac-
complish nothing if otherwise willing addressees are not free to 
receive and consider them. It would be a barren marketplace of 
ideas that had only sellers and no buyers. 62 
147 
So, how are these cases to be reconciled? Although Zemel ap-
pears to give short shrift to any right to receive information, the 
Court was really looking at the conduct that would be required 
before any information could be received. Conduct, other than 
"expressive" conduct, is not protected by First Amendment,n3 and 
therefore could not prevail over the asserted national security in-
terest. Lamont involved a similar national security interest,M but 
against speech, not mere conduct, so the First Amendment right to 
receive information was squarely before the Court. 
Justice Douglas does not even try to balance Lamont's interest 
in receiving the speech in question against the government's inter-
est in suppress~ng it. 65 He simply strikes down the regulation as an 
unconstitutional burden, like a license requirement or tax, on the 
exercise of Lamont's First Amendment right. 66 
never been considered "compelled speech." Lamont's own speech interest plays no role in 
the case, although he intended to redistribute the magazine. /d. Nor is the ultimate disposi-
tion of the material a factor in government's decision to withhold it. And Justice Bren-
nan's concurrence puts to rest any concern that the sender's speech interests are 
implicated. /d. at 308 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
62 /d. 
63 That, of course, has been the primary doctrinal argument against First Amendment 
protection for newsgathering. The author has previously written that Zemel was not really a 
newsgathering case, in part because bona fide journalists were receiving State Department 
approval to travel to Cuba. See Eric B. Easton, Two Wrongs Mock a Right: Overcoming the 
Cohen Maledicta that Bar First Amendment Protection for Newsgathering, 58 OHIO ST. LJ. 1135, 
1148 (1997) [hereinafter Easton, 'Two Wrongs]. 
64 In both cases, the regulations in question were justified in part by the claim that such 
intercourse somehow subsidized these antagonistic regimes or furthered their revolution-
ary aims. See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 14-15, and Lamont v. Posunaster General, 381 U.S. 
301, 310 (1965) (Brennan,]., concurring). 
65 It should not be surprising that Justice Douglas does not talk about "balancing," 
famous as he was for his First Amendment absolutism. See, e.g., CBS v. Democratic Natl. 
Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 156 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring in the judgment). In fact, the 
notion that there is any balancing to be done in a case involving content-based regulation 
would have been anathema to him. For a discussion of the illegitimacy of balancing in such 
circumstances, see Simon & Schuster v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 
105, 124-28 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
66 See Lamont, 381 U.S. at 305-6 ("Just as the licensing or taxing authorities in the Lovell, 
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By 1969, the Court could declare in Stanley v. Georgia67 that, "It 
is now well established that the Constitution protects the right to 
receive information and ideas."68 Citing Martin, Griswold, Lamont, 
and Pierce, Justice Marshall wrote, "This right to receive informa-
tion and ideas, regardless ofworth (citation omitted), is fundamen-
tal to our free society."6~ Significantly, Marshall tied the right to 
receive information that the Court, found by the Courtin Stanley to 
be inextricably tied to a penumbral privacy right vis a vzs 
government: 
Moreover, in the context of this case-a prosecution for mere 
possession of printed or filmed matter in the privacy of a per-
son's own home-that right [to receive information] takes on 
an added dimension. For also fundamental is the right to be 
free, except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted gov-
ernmental intrusions into one's privacy.70 
Through Stanley, then, the First Amendment right to receive 
information is consistently reaffirmed as an individual right against 
the government's interest, even the broad "public interest," in sup-
pressing obscene speech. Two months later, everything changed. 
Without citing even one of the cases discussed above, Justice 
White co-opts and distorts individuals' right to receive information 
in order to uphold the federal government's imposition of the 
Fairness Doctrine and its right of reply on broadcasters. His words 
in Red Lion have become the mantra of those advocating govern-
ment intervention in the arena of free speech: 
Because of the scarcity of radio frequencies, the Government is 
permitted to put restraints on licensees in favor of others whose 
views should be expressed on this unique medium. But the peo-
ple as a whole retain their interest in free speech by radio and 
their collective right to have the medium function consistently with 
the ends and purposes of the First Amendment. It is the right of 
the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, 
which is paramount (citations omitted). It is the purpose of the 
First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of 
ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to coun-
tenance monopolization of that market, whether it be by the 
Government itself or a private licensee (citations omitted). It is 
Thomas and Murdock cases sought to control the flow of ideas to the public, so here federal 
agencies regulate the flow of mail."). 
li7 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (striking down a Georgia law that imposed criminal penalties for 
mere possession of obscene materials). 
HH !d. at 564. 
()\) ld. 
70 !d. at 564. 
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the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, 
esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial 
here. That right may not be constitutionally abridged either by 
Congress or by the FCC.71 
149 
In Part III, I will more closely examine the thesis that Justice 
White erroneously conflated the First Amendment right to know 
with a public interest in receiving information that predates the 
First Amendment and grows out of the constitutional structure as a 
whole.72 I will not dwell on whether, after correcting their doctri-
nal foundation, the Fairness Doctrine and other broadcast regula-
tions were constitutionally permissible, although I will discuss the 
continuing viability of such regulations. 73 The question that re-
mains for us here is whether the First Amendment ever permits, let 
alone compels, government intervention to curtail one speaker's 
rights if more speech, from more and more diverse speakers, will 
reach the public listeners as a result. 74 
This question was not presented in the next "right to know" 
case, Kleindienst v. Mandel, 75 in which the Court cited both Red Lion 
and the earlier cases to acknowledge a First Amendment right to 
receive information.76 The Court wielded that right to reject the 
government's arguments that the First Amendment was not impli-
cated by the Attorney General's refusal to allow a Belgian commu-
nist entry to speak at academic meetings.77 
But the Court declined to balance that right against the "ple-
nary" power of the government to exclude aliens, 78 relying instead 
on the Attorney General's determination that Mandel had abused 
his privilege in previous visits. 79 "What First Amendment or other 
71 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (emphasis added). 
72 See infra text accompanying notes 144-68. 
73 See infra text accompanying notes 169-71. 
74 For this proposition, Justice White apparently relied on the words of Justice Black: 
"Freedom of the press from governmental interference under the First Amendment does 
not sanction repression of that freedom by private interests." Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 392 
(quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. l, 20 (1945)). Justice Black was saying 
that the First Amendment is no defense to application of the Sherman Antitrust Act to a 
combination of publishers acting to "restrain trade in news and views," id., making the 
phrase singularly inapplicable to anything Justice White was talking about. See infra note 148 
and accompanying text. 
75 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (upholding the Attorney General's power to refuse to allow an 
alien scholar to enter the country to attend academic meetings against the First Amend-
ment rights of U.S. scholars who invited him). 
76 See id. at 762-63. The Court cited both Red Lion and the line of cases vindicating 
individual First Amendment interests. 
77 See id. at 764-65. The government argued that entry involved only action, not speech, 
and that American scholars had alternative access to Mandel's ideas. 
78 See id. at 765. 
79 See id. at 769. 
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grounds may be available for attacking exercise of discretion for 
which no justification whatsoever is advanced is a question we 
neither address nor decide in this case."80 
In his dissent, however, Justice Marshall pointed out that there 
were two problems with the government's action: 
There can be no doubt that by denying the American appellees 
access to Dr. Mandel, the Government has directly prevented 
the free interchange of ideas guaranteed by the First Amend-
ment. It has, of course, interfered with appellees' personal 
rights both to hear Mandel's views and to develop and articulate 
their own views through interaction with Mandel. But as the 
court below recognized, apart from appellees' interests, there is 
also a 'general public interest in the prevention of any stifling of 
political utterance.' And the Government has interfered with 
this as well. H 1 
Marshall went on to make a strong First Amendment case, re-
lying fundamentally on the individual right expressed in Lamont to 
show that Mandel was not excludable,82 but the majority was deter-
mined to duck the issue.8:~ Although Marshall recognized that the 
"public interest" to which he referred was something "apart from" 
the individual interests of the appellees, it is not clear whether he 
was speaking about a collective right to know or the structural in-
terest I identify in Red Lion. In Kleindienst, unlike Red Lion, the two 
concepts were compatible, not conflicting, and Marshall wrote that 
government had trenched both. Consequently, the fundamental 
difference between them was obscured. 
In 1973, the difference resurfaced in another broadcasting 
case. The Court held in CBS v. Democratic National Committee 
(DNC) 84 that the First Amendment did not compel broadcasters to 
RO /d. at 770. 
81 fd. at 776 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Mandel v. Kleindienst, 325 F.Supp. 620, 
632 ( 1971)). 
H2 See Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 781. 
H:l See id. at 768-68. In a remarkable admission that it really did not know how to deal 
with this individual right to receive information, the m;~ority said: 
!d. 
Were we to endorse the proposition that governmental power to withhold a 
waiver must yield whenever a bona fide claim is made that American citizens 
wish to meet and talk with an alien excludable under § 212 (a) (28), one of 
twounsatisfactory results would necessarily ensue. Either every claim would pre-
vail,in which case the plenary discretionary authority Congress granted the Ex-
ecutive becomes a nullity, or courts in each case would be required to weigh 
the strength of the audience's interest against that of the Government in refus-
ing a waiver to the particular alien applicant, according to some as yet undeter-
mined standard. 
84 412 u.s. 94 (1973). 
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take paid editorial advertising/'5 but a majority appeared to leave 
open the possibility that the First Amendment would not prevent 
the FCC from imposing such a requirement in the public inter-
est.86 Grounding its opinion solidly in the Red Lion doctrine,87 five 
members of the Court spoke of the "continuing search for means 
to achieve reasonable regulation compatible with the First Amend-
ment rights of the public and the licensees."88 At the very least, the 
majority said, "courts should not freeze this necessarily dynamic 
process into a constitutional holding."89 
If the majority opinion in CBS is cautious and deferential, the 
separate opinions reveal dramatically how pervasive Justice White's 
error had become. Following the Court of Appeals,90 Justice Bren-
nan, writing in dissent for himself and Justice Marshall, defined the 
broadcasters as government actors and found their ban on edito-
rial advertising tantamount to censorship.91 Relying largely on Red 
Lion, Brennan focused on the public's "strong First Amendment 
interests in the reception of a full spectrum of views- presented in 
a vigorous and uninhibited manner - on controversial issues of 
public importance."92 And those interests, he said, are thwarted by 
an absolute ban on editorial advertising.9~ 
In other words, the First Amendment right to know, far from 
being merely an aggregate of individual rights against government 
suppression, could be vindicated by government regulation of 
broadcasters, i.e., other First Amendment speakers. The fiction 
that a broadcaster's ban on editorial advertising was tantamount to 
government action was not adopted by the majority, but the "pub-
lic interest" rationale was warmly embraced by all save Justices Stew-
art and Douglas. 
Justice Douglas, concurring in the judgment, vigorously 
disagreed: 
I did not participate in [Red Lion] and, with all respect, would 
not support it. The Fairness Doctrine has no place in our First 
Amendment regime. It puts the head of the camel inside the 
85 See id. at 132. 
86 /d. at 131 ("Conceivably at some future date Congress or the Commission - or the 
broadcasters- may devise some kind of limited right of access that is both practicable and 
desirable."). 
87 See id. at 101-2. 
88 !d. at 132. 
89 !d. 
9° See Bus. Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
91 See CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 180-81 (1973) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
\JI! /d. at 184. 
9~ See id. at 196-97. 
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tent and enables administration after administration to toy with 
TV or radio in order to serve its sordid or its benevolent endsY4 
Justice Stewart wrote along similar lines, expressing "consider-
able doubt" over Red Lion and calling the regulatory scheme that it 
upheld "within the outer limits of First Amendment tolerability."95 
Taking aim at the notion that government could further regulate 
broadcasters' editorial decisions based on First Amendment values, 
Justice Stewart said First Arnendmen t values themselves dictated 
that editorial decisions be made "in the free judgment of individ-
ual broadcasters" rather than by "bureaucratic fiat."96 
Justice Stewart later reiterated that position in a dissent joined 
by Justice Douglas in Pittsburgh Press v. Pittsburgh Commission on 
Human Relations.97 The cause was lost because the speech in ques-
tion was gender-based advertising, but Justice Stewart's view was 
adopted the following year by a unanimous Court in Miami Herald 
v. Tornillo.m" By finally isolating the "right to know" issue from a 
regulated medium or disfavored speech, the Court definitively an-
swered the second question raised by Red Lion. There is no right to 
know that can justify government intervention to curtail one 
speaker's rights-even if more speech, from more and diverse 
speakers, will reach the public listeners as a result. 
Tornillo's facts are constitutionally indistinguishable from Red 
Lion's. Tornillo's right of reply to adverse commentary was 
grounded in state law, not federal regulation, but there was other-
wise no difference between the two cases,. . . except, of course, 
that Tornillo sought to exercise his right of reply in a newspaper, 
not on a radio station. With Red Lion decided five years earlier, and 
reaffirmed in more recent broadcast cases,9Y the Court had only 
three alternatives: (1) apply the Red Lion rule in Tornillo, (2) over-
rule Red Lion, or (3) confine the rule of Red Lion to the broadcast 
medium. 
Not only does the Court speak approvingly of Justice Stewart's 
~~4 I d. at 154 (Douglas, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Douglas explicitly men-
tioned the "right to know," which he said had been "undermined by our decisions requir-
ing ... a reporter to disclose the sources of the information he comes across in investigative 
reporting," id. at 165 (referring to Branzberg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), while allowing 
government to avoid giving evidence through the "easy use of the stamp 'secret' or 'top 
secret."' ld. at 166 (referring to Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 
(1973). I return to that thought in Part III, infra. 
95 I d. at 138 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
96 ld. at 146. 
\!7 413 u.s. 376 (1973). 
\JH 418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
99 In addition to CBS v. DNC in 1973, see United States v. Midwest Video Cmp., 406 U.S. 
649, 669 n. 27 ( 1972). 
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position in CBS v. DNC and Pittsburgh Press, 100 it avoids any mention 
of Red Lion. And while the Court spells out the arguments of the 
"access advocates" in great detail, it never confronts their underly-
ing premise that concentrat~on of ownership in the newspaper in-
dustry undermines the public right to receive information. 
Instead, the Court holds that, however valid those arguments may 
be, the remedy sought is flatly barred by the First Amendment. 101 
Looking back from Tornillo, one finds that the Court has con-
sistently found a right to receive information that trumps the gov-
ernment's right to prevent its reception.102 At the same time, the 
Court has rejected the notion that this right to receive information 
ever justifies curtailing the right to speak-at least absent some 
constitutional infirmity in the speech (e.g., broadcasting or unlaw-
ful advertising) or the speaker (Mandel). The post-Tornillo cases 
reinforce and refine both prongs of the doctrine. 
For example, the Court upheld the right to receive informa-
tion even when the recipients were prisoners 103 or students, 104 even 
when the speech was commercial, 105 even when the speakers were 
corporations, 106 and even when conflicting constitutional values 
were present.107 And it rejected government suppression of speech 
even when suppression would favor political candidates108 or utility 
ratepayers109 whose voices might not otherwise be heard. Only 
100 418 U.S. at 255-56. 
101 See id. at 58. 
102 For the moment, I am not considering the government's right to withhold informa-
tion that it alone owns or possesses. For that discussion, see Part V, infra. 
103 See Procunier v. Martinez, 424 U.S. I, 48-49 ( 1976) (per curiam) (striking down regu-
lations governing the censorship of prisoner correspondence, holding that both sender 
and recipient derive "a protection against unjustified governmental interference with the 
intended communication" from the First and Fourteenth Amendments). 
104 See Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (rejecting a school district's unfettered 
discretion to remove books from school libraries, citing the "right to receive ideas [as] a 
necessary predicate to the recipient's meaningful exercise of his own rights of speech, 
press and political freedom."). 
105 See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 
748, 757 (1976) (striking down a state ban on the advertising of prescription drug prices, 
holding that would-be recipients of the information had standing under the First Amend-
ment to assert their right to receive it). 
106 See First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791 n. 31 (1978) (striking down a 
state law limiting corporate contributions to referendum campaigns, asserting that the 
"First Amendment rejects the 'highly paternalistic' approach of statutes [ ... ] which restrict 
what the people may hear."). 
107 See Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576 (1980) (striking down a state 
law permitting the exclusion of the public from criminal trials, pointing out that "[f]ree 
speech carries with it some freedom to listen"). 
108 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (striking down limits on campaign 
spending on the ground that "the concept that government may restrict the speech of 
some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly 
foreign to the First Amendment."). 
109 See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. I, 9-10 (1986) (vacating a 
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broadcast and, later, cable 110 cases held otherwise; but that, it turns 
out, has been more than enough to trigger a vigorous academic 
debate. I explore that debate now. 
II. THE RIGHT TO KNow MiscoNSTRUED 
Any attempt to summarize and characterize the ideological 
positions that comprise the scholarship in this area must inevitably 
strip away the subtleties and nuances that mark its finest thinking 
and writing. The intellectual and even emotional power behind 
these arguments cannot but fade in the process, and the reader is 
urged to return to the original articles and books to sample (or, as 
I have, wallow in) some of the best scholarship of our discipline. 
With that apologia, then, I begin with three important and ac-
cessible monographs from the past decade: Lucas Powe's The 
Fourth &tate and the Constitution, 111 Owen Fiss's The Irony of Free 
Speech, 112 and Lee Bollinger's Images of a Free Press. 11 ~ These books, 
along with numerous articles by these scholars and others, 114 re-
present the three main lines of thinking on the extent to which the 
First Amendment protects a "right to know"-sometimes articu-
lated, sometimes implied-even at the expense of a "right to 
speak" under certain circumstances. 115 
Professor Powe ascribes the popularization of the "right to 
Commission order requiring a utility company to disseminate the literature of a ratepayers' 
organization, relying in part on Tornillo's proscription against curtailing one speaker's right 
to speak in favor of another's). 
IIO See Turner Broad. Sys. Co. v. FCC (II), 520 U.S. 180, 227 (1998) (applying a Red Lion-
like analysis to uphold "must-carry" requirements for cable operators, with the gate-keep-
ing power of private cable operators purportedly supplying the artificial scarcity that justi-
fies government intervention). 
I I I See Powe, sufJTa note 34. 
112 OWEN M. FISS, THE 1RONY OF FREE SPEECH (1996). 
I I~ LEE C. BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS ( 1994). 
1 14 Perhaps chief among the leading scholars most neglected in this analysis is Professor 
Cass R. Sunstein, whose more recent work in this area is discussed only briefly in Part VI. 
See infra text accompanying notes 345-47. 
115 Professor Edwin Baker has recently identified four theories of democracy, and their 
corresponding views of the press, in a way that might shed further light on the theoretical 
grounding of these positions. To adherents to what Baker calls "elitist" democracy, the 
role of the press is essentially limited to "checking" government to prevent it from muz-
zling the press and prevent it from performing it~ essential mission of exposing cormption 
and incompetence among the elites who manage the country. To the "liberal pluralists," 
the press must also reflect the diverse interest~ of various segments of society, alerting 
constituencies to threat~ to those interest~ and mobilizing them to protect their interests. 
To allow the press to fulfill that function, government must prevent stmctural monopoliza-
tion and preserve partisanship. "Republicans" fear atomization and seek, instead, the com-
mon good of society. The press must be balanced, oqjective, civil and inclusive, and 
government press policy must foster, even mandate those values. Finally, what Baker calls 
"complex democracy" recognizes the importance of both liberal pluralist and republican 
values, and sees the govemment intervening through press regulation to preserve a healthy 
balance between them. See Presentation to the Association of American Law Schools, Sec-
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know" following World War II to the institutional press's desire to 
manifest its "preferred position" under the Constitution through 
special legal privileges for its reporters and editors. 116 By success-
fully equating the people's "right to know" with "freedom of the 
press," rather than insisting on special treatment for its own sake, 
Powe argues, the press was ultimately able to secure privileges from 
the Court that it neither needed nor, in the end, benefited from. 1 17 
And in so doing, it unleashed a monster. 
At about the same time, Powe says, Professor Jerome Barron's 
influential argument for a new First Amendment right of access to 
the increasingly concentrated media was validated in Red Lion's "lis-
tener-oriented, right-to-know" opinionY8 The "right to know" that 
had been so arrogantly equated with press freedom was now 
turned around to justify press regulation. 
Powe sees all subsequent cases, save an aberrational Virginia 
Pharmacy, as a repudiation of that model. 119 Nevertheless, he says, 
a new generation of academics, including Professor Fiss, rushed to 
embrace it as the rationale for inviting government regulation of 
the media as a means of overcoming the distortion of wealth and 
structural concentration on the marketplace of ideas. 120 
Duly crediting the work of other scholars, Powe neatly links 
the two "right to know" theories by showing that the institutional 
press version inevitably invoked an inquiry as to whether the press 
was, indeed, properly fulfilling its obligation to satisfy the public's 
right to know. 121 And when the answer is no, as it so often is these 
days, the academic version is ready and able to justify government's 
step into the breach with appropriate regulation. 122 
The right to know is not a right; it's a slogan. Furthermore, it 
is a dangerous slogan, because it instantly invites inquiry into the 
actual performance of a newspaper. Instead of giving the press 
more rights, it runs the risk of denying the press its most sacred 
possession, its autonomy. 123 
tion on Communications Law, January 2000; see also C. Edwin Baker, 17!e Media that Citizens 
Need, 147 U. PENN L. REv 317 (1998). 
116 Powe, supra note 34, at 242-43. Powe points out that the Associated Press's Kent 
Cooper is generally given credit for popularizing the phrase "right to know" as used in this 
discussion. !d. 
117 /d. at 243-45. 
118 !d. at 245-48. See especially Jerome A. Barron, A Right of Access and Reply to the Press, 80 
HARV. L. REv. 1641 (1967). 
119 See Powe, supra note 34, at 248-50. 
12o See id. at 250-51. Judith Lichtenberg is also noted. !d. 
121 See id. at 255-56. Powe particularly cites the work of Lillian BeVier, William Van 
Alstyne and Anthony Lewis. !d. 
122 See id. at 256-57. 
123 /d. at 257. 
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When it really counted, the Supreme Court guaranteed that 
the press could perform its various roles in our democracy. But, 
apart from Justice Douglas, and with the exception of some over-
blown dicta from other justices, the Court never saw the right-to-
know model as a viable First Amendment doctrine. Whether out of 
distrust of the press, distrust of its own abilities, or faithfulness to a 
simpler constitutional ideal, the Court never embraced either side 
of the right to know. In rejecting that theory, however, it never 
endangered the essential autonomy of a free press. 124 
Powe's characterization of Fiss's thought is based on two of 
Fiss 's influential law review articles from the 1980s. 125 By the mid-
1990s, he had pulled those views together in the slim but 
powerfully argued monograph I examine here. In it, Fiss does not 
dispute Powe's analysis of the Supreme Court's shift away from a 
right-to-know-based jurisprudence after Red Lion, 126 but unlike 
Powe, he finds no satisfaction in it. Indeed, he laments the tri-
umph of press autonomy at the expense of governmental power to 
impose regulations that further the democratic mission of the 
press: informing the public about its political options. 127 
While Fiss concedes that the press needs a "certain amount of 
autonomy from the state" to perform that function, 128 and while he 
acknowledges that the state will sometimes try to "stifle free and 
open debate," 129 he unabashedly looks to the state to act to further 
the "robustness" of public debate when other forces, namely mar-
ket forces, would curtail it. 
Government may have to allocate public resources-hand out 
megaphones-to those whose voices would not otherwise be heard 
in the public square. It may even have to silence the voices of some 
in order to hear the voices of others. Sometimes there is simply no 
other way. 130 
The failure of government to intervene in this way reduces 
free press to free enterprise, Fiss says, "and the fate of our democ-
racy will be placed wholly in the hands of the market." 131 
Where both Powe and Fiss see the Court's post-Red Lion juris-
prudence as a retreat from the regulatory model-Powe hailing it, 
124 !d. at 259. 
125 See Owen Fiss, Why the State? 100 HARV. L. REv. 781 (1987), and Owen Fiss, Free Speech 
and Social Structu-re, 71 IowA L. REv. 1405 (1986). 
126 See Fiss, supra notel12, at 79. 
1 27 See id. at 82-83. 
128 !d. at 50. 
12 9 !d. at 3. 
l!\O !d. at 4. 
l!\l !d. at 78. 
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Fiss bemoaning it-President Bollinger sees it as recognition that 
the autonomy model and the regulatory model are merely two 
ends of a spectrum of theories the Supreme Court has employed to 
strike a proper and rational balance between competing values. 1!12 
While the disparate treatment of broadcast and print media in this 
regard "makes good sense in terms of both public policy and First 
Amendment theory," 133 it is not because broadcasting is structur-
ally different from print, but because partial regulation is generally 
better than either universal regulation or no regulation at all. 134 
Bollinger explicitly rejects Powe's thesis that an affirmative 
governmental role in regulating the press is "fundamentally incon-
sistent with an open democracy,"135 asserting that Powe's catalog of 
governmental abuses is simplistic and inconclusive. 130 Bollinger 
finds that Powe's anecdotal evidence fails to show that a beneficent 
regulatory structure cannot be created that does far more good 
than harm. 137 But Bollinger also takes issue (albeit far more sym-
pathetically) with Fiss and others who predicate their advocacy of 
regulation on the failure of the unregulated marketplace to ensure 
that the public has the sufficiency and diversity of information it 
needs for democratic self-government. 138 
In Bollinger's view, the justification for regulation lies not 
merely in the failure of the marketplace, but in ourselves: 
We have good reason to be wary of ourselves, and we should fear 
not just the failures of the market system but our own failures of 
intellect. A democratic society, like an individual, should strive 
to remain conscious of the biases that skew, distort, and corrupt 
its own thinking about public issues. Society should be intellec-
tually humble in the way that a true education tries to inculcate 
respect for one's own ignorance and intellectual incapacities. 
The upshot is this: even in a world in which the press is entirely 
free and open to all voices, with a perfect market in that sense, 
human nature would still see to it that quality public debate and 
decision making would not rise naturally to the surface but 
would, in all probability, need the buoyant support of some 
form of collective action by citizens, involving public 
132 See Bollinger, supra note 113, at 109, 145. 
133 !d. at 109. 
134 See id. 
135 LuCAS A. PowE, AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE fiRST AMENDMENT 254-55 (1987). 
Powe was himself responding to Bollinger's earlier Freedom of the Press and Public Access: 
Toward a Theory of Partial Regulation of the Mass Media, 75 MicH. L. REv. 1 (1976). 
136 See Bollinger, supra note 113, at 130-131. 
137 See id. 
138 See id. at 137-38. Here, Bollinger cites Fiss's Why the State, 100 HARV. L. REv. 781 
(1987). 
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institutions. 139 
In other words, even if there were no market failure, even if all 
voices could be heard in the marketplace of ideas, we might choose 
not to listen. Absent some reformation in the way we make deci-
sions, we might choose to watch soap operas instead. 140 
But Bollinger is not sure we are ready for that kind of reform. 
And, unlike Fiss, he is not even sure "whether the government can 
be trusted with the power to intervene in the field of public de-
bate."141 The public's right to know, which-more like Powe than 
Fiss-Bollinger calls a "platitude," 14~ is largely irrelevant to his reg-
ulatory ideal, which is more interested in satisfying a societal need 
to know. Until we know more, Bollinger suggests, the complex sys-
tem that has evolved seems reasonably healthy. 143 
In the view of these scholars, then, the "right to know" is either 
an illegitimate slogan that invites government regulation to sup-
press speech in the marketplace of ideas; a vital protection that 
invokes government power against the stifling of diverse voices 
when economic power distorts that marketplace; or the mirror that 
will ultimately force us to recognize that we really do not want a 
fully stocked marketplace of ideas at all, but rather a series of prop-
erty rights that insulates us from too much information. I consider 
the first two in Part III; I return to the third in Part VI. 
III. SLAYING THE LION 
To suggest, as Powe does, that there is no "right to know" is to 
defy history, 144 case law, 14r; and common sense. Even if one does 
not accept the Meiklejohn ian notion that the First Amendment op-
erates exclusively to promote democratic values by ensuring that 
citizens have the information they need to make informed political 
decisions, 140 other First Amendment values are fully consistent with 
139 Bollinger, supra note 113, at 139. 
140 Sunstein brings this notion into the Internet age with "The Daily Me." Cass R. Sun-
stein, republic.com 3-16 (2001). 
141 Jd. at 142. 
14:.! Jd. at 149. 
143 See id. at 143. 
14 4 "A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, 
is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy, or perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern 
ignorance, and a people who mean to be their own governors, must arm themselves with 
the power that knowledge gives." Letter from james Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), 
in The Writings oJJames Madison, vol. ix, 1819-1836, 103 (Gaillard Hunted. 1910). 
14!> See sujml text accompanying notes 38-110. 
14fi See Alexander Meiklejohn, 17ze First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REv. 245, 
255 ( 1961) ("The First Amendment does not protect a 'freedom to speak.' It protects the 
freedom of those activities of thought and communication by which we 'govern.' It is con-
cerned, not with a private right, but with a public power, a governmental responsibility."). 
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a public right to know. For example, the ability of the press to 
perform the checking function on which Powe relies is considera-
bly enhanced by the newsgathering privileges that Powe says the 
press doesn't need. 147 The more exotic notion that the First 
Amendment right to speak is predicated on the noninstrumental 
value of the speaker's personal fulfillment is utterly hollow if there 
is no audience. 148 In the end, Powe's condemnation is less an as-
sessment of the right to know than of the powers that some of its 
advocates have claimed for it. 
Fortunately, those powers simply do not exist. Apart from the 
broadcasting (and possibly cable) cases, the Supreme Court has 
never held that the First Amendment compels or even condones 
the power of government to suppress some speech so that other 
speech may be heard. 149 If there is, as Justice White asserted in Red 
Lion, a "collective right" to "receive suitable access" to a variety of 
diverse voices, and if this right "belongs to the people as a whole" 
and may thus be exercised against broadcasters through the peo-
ple's government, this "right" does not spring from the First 
Amendment. 150 
Certainly this "right" is not the right of the "individual" dis-
cussed in Meyer, which was openly suspicious of infringing such 
rights in the name of the "public interest." 151 Certainly it is not the 
right of the "householder" in Martin, 152 nor the "addressee" in La-
mont, 153 the married couple in Griswold, 154 nor the movie buff in 
Stanley. 155 Nor is Justice White's purported First Amendment 
147 See Powe, supra note 34, at 245-48, 260-61. 
148 See, e.g., THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6 (1971). 
149 See Associated Press (AP) v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945), did not rely on the First 
Amendment or its penumbral right to know, but rather on the Sherman·Antitmst Act, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq., in order to force the AP to abandon its anticompetitive practices. Red 
Lions repeated allusions to dicta in AP on the First Amendment's support for government 
intervention are misplaced. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 387, 390, 392. A? invoked government 
power against business practices that effectively prevented others from publishing; the in-
junction did "not compel AP or its members to permit publication of anything which their 
'reason' tells them should not be published." AP, 326 U.S. at 20 n. 18. A closer case is 
Lorainjoumal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951), which upheld use of the Sherman 
Act to force a publisher to accept advertising it would otherwise have refused. ld. at 144. 
Despite the direct effect on the publisher's overall product, there was no suppression of 
the publisher's speech such as that later found in Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 256-
58. The order affected only commercial advertising, and then only that advertising the 
publisher refused in order to drive a competing radio station out of business. Lorain jour-
nal, 342 U.S. at 155-56. There was no indication that the publisher was compelled to pub-
lish, or prevented from publishing, anything contrary to its journalistic "reason." /d. 
IfiO Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390. 
151 262 U.S. 390. 
lfi2 319 u.s. 141. 
153 381 u.s. 301. 
154 381 u.s. 479. 
lfi5 394 u.s. 557. 
160 CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT [Vol. 21:139 
"right" an aggregation of these. If nothing else, his use of the word 
"suitable" suggests something other than a First Amendment right 
to receive information. Stanley had made no such qualification; on 
the contrary, Justice Marshall had made the point that right to re-
ceive information stood independent of the value of the informa-
tion or even its eligibility for First Amendment protection. 15r, 
Assuming arguendo that Justice White reached the correct re-
sult from a faulty doctrinal analysis, what does justify Red Lion's 
conclusion? 
First, Red Lion presented two related factors that were not in-
volved in the earlier cases: a speaker whose right to speak at all was 
granted by and retained at the sufferance of government, and 
speech that might not have reached the listener but for the govern-
ment's regulation. The influence of the first of these factors is eas-
ily seen in the two precedents Justice White selected to support his 
assertion that the right of the viewers and listeners is paramount. 157 
Both involve the FCC's allocation of licenses among competitors in 
the public interest as a question of statutory construction. Neither 
mentions the First Amendment nor even remotely deals with the 
issue of broadcast content. One of them, however, provides a clue 
to the origin of the right that Justice White finds. 
·But the Act does not essay to regulate the business of the licen-
see. The Commission is given no supervisory control of the pro-
grams, of business management or of policy. In short, the 
broadcasting field is open to anyone, provided there be an availa-
ble frequency over which he can broadcast without interference to 
others, if he shows his competency, the adequacy of his equipment, 
and financial ability to make good use of the assigned channel. 
The policy of the Act is clear that no person is to have anything in the 
nature of a property right as a result of the granting of a license. ~icenses 
are limited to a maximum of three years' duration, may be re-
voked, and need not be renewed. Thus the channels presently oc-
cupied remain free for a new assignment to another licensee in the 
interest of the listening public. 
Plainly it is not the purpose of the Act to protect a licensee 
I5fl See Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565 ("[M]ere categorization of these films as 'obscene' is in-
sufficient justification for such a drastic invasion of personal liberties guaranteed by the 
First and Fourteenth Amendment."). Years later, Justice Scalia would also reject the notion 
that any speech was "entirely invisible to the Constitution" such that it can be regulated in 
a way that, itself, violates the First Amendment. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383-
84 (1992). 
!57 See FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475 (1940), and FCC v. Allen-
town B'casting Corp., 349 U.S. 358, 361-62 (1955).Justice White also draws on the writings 
of Zechariah Chafee for the Commission on Freedom of the Press, citing 2 Govt. and Mass 
Commun. 546 (1947). 
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against competition but to protect the public. Congress intended 
to leave competition in the business of broadcasting where it found 
it, to permit a licensee who was not interfering electrically with 
other broadcasters to survive or succumb according to his ability to 
make his programs attractive to the public. 158 
Evidently, Justice White extrapolated his version of the collec-
tive First Amendment right to receive information from the propri-
etary rights of the public 159-whose ownership of the spectrum is 
exercised through Congress and the FCC-and the resulting li-
cense obligations of broadcasters. Both are the proper subject of 
government oversight and regulation. In that respect, it differs 
dramatically from a collective First Amendment right derived by 
aggregating individual rights against government suppression. 
But Red Lion was not a simple contracts case. Although Justice 
White was wrong to draw support for his conclusion from a First 
Amendment right to know, he was certainly correct to identify an 
overriding public interest in the "widest possible dissemination of 
information from diverse and antagonistic sources."160 Elsewhere 
in the opinion, he correctly identifies that interest as instrumental 
in "producing an informed public capable of conducting its own 
affairs," which he describes as a "goal" of the First Amendment. 161 
That description is fair enough; the judicial and scholarly literature 
declaring self-government to be an important, if not the only, rea-
son to protect speech is rich indeed. 162 As long as Justice White 
speaks in terms of "consistency" with First Amendment purposes, 
or the absence of sanction within the First Amendment for incon-
sistent governmental action, he is on solid ground. But the fram-
ers apparently understood the need for an informed, self-
governing citizenry to fulfill their constitutional dreams long 
before they accepted the need for a written guarantee in a Bill of 
Rights. The constitutional scheme itself is a far more focused in-
strument for producing an informed electorate, or rather, limiting 
the electorate to informed citizens. 163 Limitations on who could 
158 Sanders Bros., 309 U.S. at 475 (emphasis added). 
159 This reference to the public's proprietary rights in the spectrum should not be con-
fused with the view that First Amendment rights are akin to property rights insofar as they 
establish the relationship between the individual and the government. See john 0. McGin-
nis, The Once and Future Property-Based Vision of the Hrst Amendment, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 49 
( 1996). 
160 Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945). 
161 Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 392. 
162 See generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITs RELATION To SELF-GOVERN-
MEI'.'T (1948); ZECHARIAH CHAFEEjR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1964); THOMAS I. 
EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1966). 
163 Madison's Federalist 10, for example, extols the ability of a republican government "to 
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vote for or serve in the Congress, the interposition of a Senate 
elected by state legislatures against the "People's House," and the 
Electoral College 164 were all aimed at producing decision-makers 
from among the nation's educated and knowledgeable elite, not to 
mention other characteristics that might seem even less attractive 
today. 
Indeed, the Federalists saw no need for a Bill of Rights at all, 
but accepted it as politically expedient in the face of Antifederalist 
warnings that the new national government would trample state 
prerogatives and individualliberties. 1fir. Certainly they saw no need 
for a First Amendment to educate the masses they had so carefully 
excluded from power. By the time the First Amendment was 
adopted, even the Antifederalists had lost interest; 166 its language 
was terse, debate and explication minimal, and it had only one pur-
pose: to limit federal meddling with pre-existing rights. 167 How-
ever the meaning and significance of the First Amendment may 
have evolved over the years since ratification, only one change in 
the amendment's fundamental nature was ever adopted: after 
1921, states, too, were prohibited from interfering with freedom of 
speech by virtue of the 14th Amendment. 161'1 
Thus, if the public interest on which Red Lion is predicated 
comes not from the First Amendment, but from the constitutional 
structure as a whole, the regulatory regime that Red Lion sanc-
tioned cannot be a product of the First Amendment's right to 
know, even if that right were aggregated. The only "paramount" 
right that the public holds in broadcasting is a proprietary one, 
which the public acquired by virtue of its natural ownership of the 
spectrum. The First Amendment operates to ensure that neither 
the owner, i.e., the collective public, nor its steward, i.e., the gov-
ernment, violates the speech, press and related rights of their licen-
sees as they go about the business of bringing the spectrum to life. 
refine and enlarge the public views by passing them through the medium of a chosen body 
of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the tme interest of their country and whose 
patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial con-
siderations." The.Fedemlist No. 10, at 82 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter, ed., 1961). 
104 U.S. Const. art. I, §§ 2, 3; art. II, § 1. 
165 See b:oNARD W. LEW, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 255 (1985). One might argue that 
the First Amendment was adopted, in part, to protect some higher value, but the evidence 
is less than compelling. About all we know of the original purpose of the First Amendment 
is this: ratification of the Constitution depended on a promise to adopt a bill of rights, 
including a guarantee to protect a rather ambiguous concept of free speech and press 
from abridgment by the new federal government. ld. at 234-35. 
1 66 See id. at 236. 
167 In fact, the Senate killed an amendment proposed by Madison to protect speech and 
press freedoms from the states as well as the federal government. !d. at 262. 
I fi8 See Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 652. 
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We leave for another day any thorough exploration of whether 
content regulation of broadcasting is barred by the First Amend-
ment, notwithstanding public ownership of the spectrum or the 
public interest in information from diverse speakers. With each 
passing day, the question, like broadcasting itself, grows less impor-
tant. Briefly, however, this analysis suggests that government may 
regulate broadcast industry structure, but not content, with a view 
toward ensuring that diverse viewpoints are aired. 
The public through its government might have chosen to re-
tain for itself the privilege to speak over the spectrum, as have any 
number of other countries, but instead elected to allocate that priv-
ilege among private entities. No one doubts that the public, 
through its government, has the power to withdraw that privilege 
tomorrow, but no one expects such an action either. And, as long 
as licensees are privileged to broadcast, they are First Amendment 
speakers, whose freedom of speech cannot be abridged by the pub-
lic or its government. 
The obvious analogy is the limited public forum. 169 The pub-
lic, through its government, invited certain individuals (broadcast-
ers) to speak in a publicly owned place (the electromagnetic 
spectrum) subject to a reasonable and necessary time, place, and 
manner restrictions (allocating licenses). Having created this fo-
rum, the First Amendment requires the public and government to 
give up the power of viewpoint-based regulation, including, I sub-
mit, the power to ensure by direct regulation that a diversity of 
viewpoints is expressed. The public can reclaim that power only by 
closing the forum. 
That is not to say that the public, through its government, is 
constrained by the First Amendment from withdrawing proprietary 
rights it has conferred on media companies. The antitrust actions 
in APand Lorain journal were not incompatible with the guarantees 
of free speech and free press, nor is antitrust scrutiny of media 
mergers. 170 And, as discussed in Part V, the First Amendment right 
to know demands limits on copyright privileges. What matters is 
that, in neither of these cases, is government intervening to sup-
press some speakers in favor of others. 171 
Having thus freed the right to know from its unsavory associa-
169 See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the U. ofVa., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) 
("Once [the state] has opened a limited fomm ... [it may not] discriminate against speech 
on the basis of its viewpoint."). 
170 See Robert H. Lande, Consumer Choice as the Ultimate Goal of Antitrust, 62 U. Prrr. L. 
REv. 503, 517-18 (2001) ("[M]edia mergers should be carefully scrutinized for loss of non-
price competition along the dimension of diversity in programming."). 
171 Cable regulation arguably does curtail some of the rights of First Amendment speak-
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tion with broadcast regulation, Powe's primary objection and Fiss's 
primary justification go away. I will return to President Bollinger's 
analysis after reviewing the jurisprudence that demonstrates the 
central thesis of this article: that the First Amendment right to 
know is manifest in the "public importance" test that the Supreme 
Court regularly applies in libel and especially privacy cases, and in-
consistently applies in newsgathering, access, and copyright cases. 
IV. WHERE IMPORTANCE IS ALREADY IMPORTANT 
A. 
Recognition of the "right to know" should be immediately ap-
parent where the public's interest in speech has been found to al-
ter the fact or scope of the speaker's tort or statutory liability. It 
would defy logic to suggest that the First Amendment protects 
speech about public concerns solely because of some benefit real-
ized by the speaker. 
Before 1964, the relatively few such cases arose in a labor rela-
tions context. In 1937, for example, the Court required the Associ-
ated Press (AP) to reinstate an employee who was discharged for 
union organizing activitiesP2 The dissent urged that, because 
union organizing was a matter of great public interest, AP's ability 
to report objectively on that subject was protected by the First 
Amendment; realizing that protection, it reasoned, depended 
upon AP's ability to fire an editorial employee who was also a 
union activist. 173 In 1940, the Court struck down legislation re-
stricting labor union picketing, citing the public interest in labor 
relations. 174 And in 1959, the public interest in possible misuse of 
federal agency funds was one of the factors prompting the Court to 
immunize a government official from the libel claims of employees 
ers, but not without a degree of heightened scm tiny unavailable to broadcasters. See Tur-
ner I, 512 U.S. at 661. 
172 See AP v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937) (holding that requiring a media employer to 
reinstate an employee discharged because of union organizing activities did not violate the 
First Amendment). 
In /d. at 138 (Sutherland, J., dissenting). 
/d. 
The daily news with respect to labor disputes is now of vast proportions; and 
clearly a considerable part of petitioner's editorial service must be devoted to 
that sul~ject. Such news is not only of great public interest; but an unbiased 
version of it is of the utmost public concern. To give a group of employers on 
the one hand, or a labor organization on the other, power of control over such 
a service is obviously to endanger the fairness and accuracy of the service. 
"
4 See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-102 (1940) ("The freedom of speech and 
of the press guaranteed by the Constitution embraces at the least the liberty to discuss 
publicly and truthfully all matters of public concern without previous restraint or fear of 
subsequent punishment."). 
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whom he had publicly dismissed. 175 
It was only in 1964, however, that the Court came to view the 
public interest in the content of speech as a value to be balanced 
against other individual or proprietary rights. 176 The case, of 
course, was New York Times v. Sullivan177, and the balancing test is 
obscured somewhat by the way the Court formulated the new rule, 
i.e., raising, on constitutional grounds, the degree of a libel defen-
dant's culpability required for recovery when the plaintiff is a pub-
lic official. 178 The underlying presumption is that all speech about 
public officials bearing on their fitness for or performance in office 
is a matter of public importance, even if false, and that importance 
outweighs the common law interest in reputation. 179 To give effect 
to that balance, the Court deprived public-official plaintiffs of their 
common-law reputational interest, substituting a narrower, consti-
tutionally limited, reputational interest. That same year, the Court 
reinforced this principle by extending it to criminal as well as civil 
libel cases. 180 
175 See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 575 (1959) ("It would be an unduly restrictive view 
of the scope of the duties of a policy-making executive official to hold that a public state-
ment of agency policy in respect to matters of wide public interest and concern is not 
action in the line of duty."). 
176 Even though Barr speaks in terms of "weighing" individual rights against the public 
interest, id. at 565, the public interest addressed in that sentence refers to the public's 
interest in protecting officials from frivolous lawsuits. The public interest in the substance 
of the speech, misuse of funds, was essentially evidence bearing on whether the defendant 
was acting within the scope of his official duties, the sine qua non for finding a privilege. !d. 
at 575. 
177 376 u.s. 254 (1964). 
178 See id. at 279-80 (1964). 
The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a 
public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to 
his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with actual 
malice-that is, with knowledge thin it was false or with reckless disregard of 
whether it was false or not. 
179 See id. at 271-73. 
!d. 
Thus we consider this case against the background of a profound national com-
mitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, 
robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and 
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks o·n government and public officials. (Ci-
tation omitted.) The present advertisement, as an expression of grievance and 
protest on one of the major public issues of our time, would seem clearly to 
qualify for the constitutional protection. The question is whether it forfeits that 
protection by the falsity of some of its factual statements and by its alleged 
defamation of respondent. ... If neither factual error nor defamatory content 
suffices to remove the constitutional shield from criticism of official conduct, 
the combination of the two elements is no less inadequate. 
180 See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964). 
The New York Times rule is not rendered inapplicable merely because an offi-
cial's private reputation, as well as his public reputation, is harmed. 17w public-
official rule protects the paramount public interest in a free flow of information to the 
people concerning public officials, their seroants. To this end, anything which might 
touch on an official's fitness for office is relevant. (Emphasis added.) 
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The Court's procedural focus on the status of the plaintiff 
when its real concern was the public interest in the content of the 
speech at issue became increasingly problematic as lower courts 
struggled to apply New York Times. Inevitably, status came to be ex-
pressed in terms of public importance, 181 until, in Rosenbloom v. Me-
tromedia, 18~ a plurality of the Court voted to drop the surrogacy 
altogether and grant New York Times protection to all speech about 
matters of "public or general concern." 183 
Opposition to the new rule stood on four separate grounds: 
(1) that the First Amendment does not tolerate any libel judg-
ments against the news media, 184 (2) that the rule unnecessarily 
usurped state libel law, 185 (3) that the rule would subject the press 
to 'judicial second-guessing of the newsworthiness of each item 
they print," 186 and ( 4) that courts are better equipped to apply gen-
eral rules than to balance facts in every libel case. 187 The first can 
be dismissed as merely an ideological or idiosyncratic expression; 
the third will be more fully examined in Part VI. 
It was the second and fourth grounds on which the Court sub-
sequently overturned Rosenbloom. 188 Writing for the Court in Gertz, 
Justice Powell found the state's interest in protecting its citizens' 
reputations more substantial than Rosenbloom admitted and cau-
tioned that relying on judges' ad hoc determinations in every case 
"would lead to unpredictable results and uncertain expectations," 
as well as making supervision of the lower courts "unmanage-
able."1119 Accordingly, Gertz lays down what Justice Powell charac-
terized as "broad rules of general application," 190 focusing once 
again on the status of the plaintiff rather than the newsworthiness 
!d. 
181 See, e.g., Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 ( 1966) (limiting application of the rule to 
positions with "such apparent importance that the public has an independent interest in 
the qualifications and performance of the person who holds it"); Curtis Publg. Co. v. Butts, 
388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967)(Warren, CJ., concurring in the result) ("Our citizenry has a 
legitimate and substantial interest in the conduct of [public figures], and freedom of the 
press to engage in uninhibited debate about their involvement in public issues and events 
is as cmcial as it is in the case of 'public officials."'). 
IH~ 403 U.S. 29 (1971). 
l8:'1 !d. at 52. 
IH4 See id. at 57 (Black,J., concurring in the judgment). 
I H5 See id. at 59 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). 
1H6 /d. at 63 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also id. at 79 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
l87 See id. at 63 (Harlan,J., dissenting); see also id. at 81 (Marshall,J., dissenting). 
l88 See Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974) ("The extension of the New York Times 
test proposed by the Rosenbloom plurality would abridge this legitimate state interest to a 
degree that we find unacceptable. And it would occasion the additional difficulty of forc-
ing state and federal judges to decide on an ad hoc basis which publications address issues 
of 'general or public interest' and which do not. ... "). 
I H9 /d. at 343. 
190 /d. at 343-44. 
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of the utterance. 1Y1 
Notwithstanding that repudiation of Rosenbloom, an assessment 
of the public interest in the defamatory utterance crept back into 
libel jurisprudence, albeit through a back door of sorts. In Dun & 
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 1\12 the Court held that "per-
mitting recovery of presumed and punitive damages in defamation 
cases absent a showing of 'actual malice' does not violate the First 
Amendment when the defamatory statements do not involve matters of 
public concern." 1Y3 
One need not join the debate over whether Gertz itself con-
tained this distinction, implicitly or explicitly; 194 it suffices to say 
that Justice Powell no longer seemed concerned about the burden 
that a "public interest" analysis imposes on judges and, in fact, de-
voted only two paragraphs to that analysis in this case. 195 Mter Dun 
& Bradstreet, the First Amendment requires courts to determine 
whether defamatory statements involve matters of public concern, 
at least where plaintiffs are private figures seeking to recover pre-
sumed or punitive damages without showing New York Times malice. 
B. 
The right to know, again manifested by a "public importance" 
balancing test, is even stronger, and surfaces earlier, in constitu-
tional privacy cases. Even before the Court extended the New York 
Times rule to public-figure libel plaintiffs, 1v6 it held in Time, Inc. v. 
HilfY7 that privacy interests involving false, but not defamatory, 
speech must yield to constitutional protections for speech and 
press, absent knowing falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. 198 
Although largely couched in terms of protecting the speaker, 199 
Justice Brennan makes clear that the constitutional guarantees are 
"not for the benefit of the press so much as for the benefit of all of 
191 This is not to say that characterizing libel plaintiffs as public or private figures is 
without its own problems. Although Powell averred that "we have no difficulty in distin-
guishing among defamation plaintiffs," id. at 344, subsequent cases would suggest other-
wise. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976), Wolston v. Reader's Digest 
Assn., 443 U.S. 157 (1979), Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979). 
l\l2 472 u.s. 749 (1985). 
l\l3 Id. at 763 (emphasis added). 
l\l4 See id. at 761 n.7. 
I \l5 See id. at 762-63. 
1\l6 See Curtis Publg. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967). 
197 385 u.s. 374 (1967). 
1 \JS See id. at 387-88. Despite Justice Brennan's admonition that even a negligence stan-
dard would place an intolerable burden on the press in this context, some court~ have 
applied the Gertz rationale to false light privacy cases. See, e.g., Dresbach v. Doubleday & 
Co., 518 F. Supp. 1285, 1288 (D.D.C. 1981). 
199 See Hill, 385 U.S. at 389. 
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us."j!00 This is, unmistakably, the right to know. 
The right to know is strongest, of course, when the speech in 
question is true. Beginning with Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 201 
the Court has inched its way toward a still-undeclared declaration 
that truthful speech may never be suppressed or punished to pro-
tect individual privacy interests-if at all. From Cox Broadcasting's 
limited holding that no liability could be imposed for publishing 
truthful information taken from official court records,202 the doc-
trine evolved to cover nearly all truthful information about matters 
of public significance.j!03 In Bartnicki v. Vopper, 204 the Court 
brought the doctrine to its highest level to date. 
In Bartnicki, an unknown person intercepted a cellular tele-
phone conversation between Gloria Bartnicki, a Pennsylvania 
teachers' union negotiator, and Anthony Kane, president of the 
union local. The conversation pertained to on-going negotiations 
between the union and the school board, including possible strike 
preparations and "the need for a dramatic response to the board's 
intransigence."j!05 At one point in the conversation, Kane says: "If 
they're not gonna move for three percent, we're gonna have to go 
to their, their homes ... To blow off their front porches, we'll have 
to do some work on some of those guys."206 
Whoever taped the conversation delivered it to the head of a 
local taxpayer's organization, who, in turn, delivered it to Freder-
ick Vopper, a local radio commentator, and other media outlets. 
The taped conversation was repeatedly broadcast by Vopper and 
others, and its substance was published in local newspapers. Alleg-
ing that each of the defendants "knew or had reason to know" that 
the original intercept was illegal, Bartnicki and Kane sued under 
both federal and Pennsylvania law, which criminalized the knowing 
200 !d. 
201 420 u.s. 469 (1975). 
202 See id. at 496. 
203 See Oklahoma Publg. Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308, 310 (1977) (holding that 
publication of truthful information revealed in open court could not be suppressed); see 
also Landmark Comm. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978) (holding the First Amendment 
prohibits criminal punishment of third persons who are strangers to the inquiry, including 
the news media, for divulging or publishing truthful information regarding confidential 
proceedings of a judicial review commission); Smith v. Daily Mail Publg. Co., 443 U.S. 97, 
103 (1979) (holding that publication of truthful information, lawfully obtained, may not 
be punished absent a need to further a state interest of highest order); Florida Star v. 
BJ.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989) (holding that publication of truthful information, lawfully 
obtained, may be punished "only when narrowly tailored to a state interest of the highest 
order"). 
204 121 S. Ct. 1753 (2001). 
205 !d. at 1757. 
2oo !d. 
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disclosure of an illegally intercepted conversation.207 On cross-mo-
tions for summary judgment, the district court rejected Vopper's 
First Amendment defense, but granted his motion for an interlocu-
tory appeal. 208 The Court of Appeals applied an intermediate scru-
tiny standard209 to hold the statutes unconstitutional as deterring 
more speech than necessary to protect the privacy interests at 
stake.210 
The U.S. Supreme Court accepted petitioners' contentions 
that the original intercept was illegal and that respondents had rea-
son to know that fact. The Court also accepted respondents' asser-
tions that they played no part in the intercept, that they committed 
no unlawful act in gaining access to the tape, and that the "subject 
matter of the conversation was a matter of public concern."211 
In the opinion written by Justice Stevens, the Court acknowl-
edged that the law was content neutral, but also found the statutes' 
disclosure provisions aimed directly at "pure speech," rather than 
conduct or any hybrid of the two.212 Without explicitly characteriz-
ing the degree of scrutiny it would apply, the Court proceeded to 
"consider whether, given the facts of this case, the interests served 
by§ 2511 (1) (c) can justify its restrictions on speech."213 The Court 
minimized the government's asserted interest in deterring illegal 
interceptions214 and focused instead on the "considerably 
stronger" interest in privacy.215 "In this case," the Court said, "pri-
vacy concerns give way when balanced against the interest in pub-
lishing matters of public importance"216 and no "stranger's illegal 
conduct" can "remove that First Amendment shield."217 In a con-
curring opinion written "only to stress the narrowness of the 
207 /d. (quoting 18 U.S.C. 2511(1)(c) and related provisions). 
208 See Bartnicki, 121 S. Ct. at 1758. 
209 See id. (citing Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109, 121 (3d Cir. 1999)). 
21o See Bartnicki, 200 F.3d at 129. 
211 Bartnicki, 121 S. Ct. at 1760. 
/d. 
If the statements about the labor negotiations had been made in a public arena 
- during a bargaining session, for example - they would have been newsworthy. 
This would also be true if a third party had inadvertently overheard Bartnicki 
making the same statements to Kane when the two thought they were alone. 
212 /d. at 1761. 
213 /d. at 1762. Although this sounds like ad hoc balancing, the Court is presumably 
applying strict scrutiny. In O'Brien v. United States, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968), which spells 
out the generic intermediate scrutiny test, the asserted governmental interest must be "un-
related to the suppression of free expression." Apparently, Justice Stevens found the regu-
lation of "pure speech" too closely related to the suppression of free expression to warrant 
intermediate scrutiny in this case. ' 
214 See Bartnicki, 121 S. Ct. at 1762. 
215 /d. at 1764. 
216 /d. at 1765. 
217 /d. 
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Court's holding" in light of physical threats to board members 
within the taped conversation,218 Justice Breyer reached the same 
conclusion as the majority by asking only whether the statutes 
struck a "reasonable balance between their speech-restricting and 
speech-enhancing consequences."219 Chief Justice Rehnquist, dis-
senting, condemned the majority's "tacit application of strict scru-
tiny"220 and applied intermediate scrutiny to reach the opposite 
result. 221 
So how does Bartnicki contribute to the Court's right-to-know 
jurisprudence and help to define the concept? The focus of the 
constitutional inquiry is on the rights of the speaker, Vopper, not 
those of his radio audience. It is Vopper's right to publish the in-
formation-the nature of its acquisition apparently of little con-
cern to anyone on the Court, as long as Vopper was not involved-
that trumps Bartnicki's right to keep it private. The only reference 
to the listener is oblique: the high Qustice Breyer says "unusually 
high"222) public interest in the labor dispute and any information 
about it. 
But that oblique reference precisely identifies Bartnicki's con-
tribution to right-to-know jurisprudence: in its aggregated form, 
the individual's right to know is the public importance of specific 
information that the Court here called a "matter of public con-
cern." At some point, that importance negates the state's interest 
in suppression, as well as private interests in reputation and pri-
vacy, even where acquisition of the information is tainted by illegal 
conduct. Evidently, the bar is not terribly high, for, contrary to the 
Court's assertion, Vopper's legitimate interest in broadcasting the 
tape was really quite low.223 
For years now, the Court has equivocated on whether publica-
tion of illegally acquired information can be punished. If the Pen-
tagon Papers case settled the issue as to prior restraint,224 Chief 
Justice Rehnquist here points out that five justices may well have 
voted then to punish the newspapers for publishing the purloined 
documents.225 The constitutional privacy cases are replete with 
218 ld. at 1766. 
21\l fd. 
22o I d. at l 770. 
221 See id. at l 772. 
222 ld. at 1768. 
223 The emphasis is mine, but it mirrors Justice Breyer's emphasis on the limited legiti-
macy of Bartnicki's privacy interest. See id. at 1767. I use the word "legitimate" somewhat 
facetiously, of course, since I believe the Court's traditional positions as described here are 
generally wrong. 
224 See New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
225 See Bartnicki, 121 S. Ct. at 1776. 
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cautionary disclaimers,226 enough to persuade lower courts that 
they could enjoin or punish illegally acquired speech.227 In Bart-
nicki, though, the taint of unlawful acquisition seems to be of little 
consequence. But if it had any effect at all, it must have been to 
reduce, not enhance, Vopper's interest in publication. 
Moreover, the majority's suggestion that the information 
would be fair game if overheard228 is more than offset by the fact-
alluded to in all three opinions-that Vopper's broadcast could 
have been enjoined or punished if the conversation had been 
taped by its authors, Bartnicki and Kane, and protected by copy-
right.229 Before Bartnicki, one could even argue along similar lines 
that the speech in question was not Vopper's at all, so how strong 
could his interest have been?230 
Notwithstanding Justice Breyer's apparent concern for the 
safety of the school board (as in ''I'm shocked, shocked to find that 
gambling is going on in here."231 ), the Supreme Court long ago 
recognized that hyperbole permeates the speech of union officials 
226 See, e.g., Florida Star v. B.]. F., 491 U.S. 524, 535 n.8 (1989) ("The Daily Mail principle 
does not settle the issue whether, in cases where information has been acquired unlawfully 
by a newspaper or by a source, government may ever punish not only the unlawful acquisi-
tion, but the ensuing publication as well. This issue was raised but not definitively resolved 
in New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), and reserved in Landmark Com-
munications, 435 U.S., at 837. We have no occasion to address it here."). 
227 See Easton, supra note 63, at 1187-91 (1997) (discussing various cases in which the 
court imposed or considered injunctive relief or damages for publishing illegally acquired 
information). 
228 See Bartnicki, 121 S. Ct. at 1760. 
229 The majority cites Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985), 
for the proposition that communications privacy is an important government interest. 
The essential thrust of the First Amendment is to prohibit improper restraints 
on the voluntary public expression of ideas; it shields the man who wants to 
speak or publish when others wish him to be quiet. There is necessarily, and 
within suitably defined areas, a concomitant freedom not to speak publicly, one 
which serves the same ultimate end as freedom of speech in its affirmative 
aspect. 
Bartnicki, 121 S. Ct. at 1764 n.20 (quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 559, which in turn 
quoted Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 244 N.E.2d 250, 255 (N.Y. 1968)). 
Justice Breyer refers to the same passage to suggest that the statutes at issue "directly en-
hance private speech," Bartnicki, 121 S. Ct. at 1766, as does Chiefjustice Rehnquist. Id. at 
1775. 
230 See Boehner v. McDermott, 191 F.3d 463, 466 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert. granted, judm. 
vacated, 121 S.Ct. 2190 (2001), another of the three cases that created the conflict in the 
circuit~ that the Court sought to resolve by granting certiorari in Bartnicki, 121 S. Ct. at 
1758 (citing Peavy v. WFM-TV, Inc., 221 F.3d 158 (5th Cir. 2000). The Boehner court, 
which upheld the provisions at issue in Bartnicki, had ridiculed the defendant's assertion 
that his disclosure of an intercepted telephone conversation constituted protected speech: 
[T]hose who expose private activity to public gaze are not necessarily engaging 
in speech, let alone "the freedom of speech." ... The tape does indeed contain 
speech about political matters. But the speech is not McDermott's and 
§§ 2511(1)(c) does not render him liable for anything anyone said on the 
recording." 
Boehner, 191 F.3d at 466. 
231 Casablanca (Warner Bros. 1942). 
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and discounted it for purposes of libel.232 Absent a trial record, 
there is no way to determine how serious this "threat" might have 
been, and Justice Breyer correctly absolved editors of the responsi-
bility for making such determinations.233 But Vopper only broad-
cast the threat after the parties accepted a nonbinding arbitration 
proposal that was generally favorable to the teachers.234 Vopper 
himself had been critical of the union, as was the intermediary 
from whom he received it.235 
On the other hand, one is hard pressed to find fault with 
Chief Justice Rehnquist's analysis of Bartnicki and Kane's privacy 
interest,236 or the larger societal interest in encouraging private dis-
cussion of public matters.237 Pointing out that the Court "does not 
even attempt to define" the "amorphous concept" of "public con-
cern," Chief Justice Rehnquist charges that the decision "dimin-
ishes, rather than enhances, the purposes of the First Amendment: 
chilling the speech of the millions of Americans who rely upon 
electronic technology to communicate each day."238 
There are three possible explanations for this decision, each 
of which is reflected in Justice Stevens's opinion. First, the Court 
may have viewed this case as the next unavoidable, incremental 
step toward deciding that "truthful publication may [n]ever be 
232 "[F]ederal law gives a union license to use intemperate, abusive, or insulting lan-
guage without fear of restraint or penalty if it believes such rhetoric to be an effective 
means to make its point." Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 283 
(citing Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 60 (1966)). 
233 See Bartnicki, 121 S.Ct. at 1768. 
234 See id. at 1757. 
235 See id. 
236 Pointing out that 40 states and the District of Columbia had enacted similar prohibi-
tions on knowing disclosure of intercepted conversations, Chief Justice Rehnquist quoted 
congressional findings that, 
tremendous scientific and technological developments that have taken place in 
the last century have made possible today the widespread use and abuse of 
electronic surveillance techniques. As a result of these developments, privacy of 
communication is seriously jeopardized by these techniques of surveillance .... 
No longer is it possible, in short, for each man to retreat into his home and be 
left alone. Every spoken word relating to each man's personal, marital, relig-
ious, political, or commercial concerns can be intercepted by an unseen audi-
tor and turned against the speaker to the auditor's advantage. 
/d. at 1769 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting) (quoting Sen. Rpt. 90-1097, at 67 (1968)). 
237 Indeed, both the Chief Justice and Justice Stevens quoted from a 1967 Presidential 
Commission: 
In a democratic society privacy of communication is essential if citizens are to 
think and act creatively and constructively. Fear or suspicion that one's speech 
is being monitored by a stranger, even without the reality of such activity, can 
have a seriously inhibiting effect upon the willingness to voice critical and con-
structive ideas. 
Bartnicki, 121 S.Ct. at 1769-70 (quoting President's Commission on Law Enforcement and 
Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 202 ( 1967)). 
238 Bartnicki, 121 S.Ct. at 1769. 
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punished consistent with the First Amendment."239 This question 
has plagued the Supreme Court at least since Cox Broadcasting Corp. 
v. Cohn240 in 1975 and perhaps, Chief Justice Rehnquist's 
headcount notwithstanding, since the Pentagon Papers case in 
1971.241 Justice Stevens recites Daily Mail's admonition that "state 
action to punish the publication of truthful information seldom 
can satisfy constitutional standards,"242 but he also emphasizes the 
narrowness of the Bartnicki holding.243 Bartnicki is a major step to-
ward the end game, but the Court is not yet ready to predicate its 
decisions on a doctrine of absolute protection for the category of 
truthful speech. 
The second possibility is that one or another of the balancing 
tests is really at work here. I have already noted the ambiguity in 
the standard used by the Court; in truth, the actual analysis seems 
just about the same in all three opinions. A cynic might say that 
the press always wins when strict scrutiny is applied; that the press 
usually loses when the Chief Justice applies intermediate scrutiny; 
and that no prediction is possible when Justice Breyer balances val-
ues ad hoc. .But if Bartnicki is merely Justice Stevens leading the 
Court in an application of strict scrutiny, what in these facts com-
pels that test? Stevens calls it "pure" speech, perhaps to distinguish 
it from the hybrids (symbolic speech, expressive conduct) that in-
239 /d. at 1762. 
240 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (denying recovery against a newspaper for publishing the name 
of a rape victim that appeared in official court documents). Other cases in that line in-
clude Landmark Communications v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978) (barring prosecution of 
a nonparty newspaper for publishing truthful information about a confidential proceed-
ings of a judicial disciplinary commission); Oklahoma Publishing v. District Court, 430 U.S. 
308 (1977) (striking down an injunction against publishing the name of a juvenile of-
fender tried in open court); Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979) (bar-
ring prosecution of newspaper for publishing the name of a juvenile suspect obtained· by 
interviewing witnesses, the police and a prosecutor); and Florida Star v. BJ,F., 491 U.S. 524 
(1989) (denying recovery against a newspaper for publishing the name of a sexual assault 
victim obtained from a publicly released police report). See supra note194. 
241 403 u.s. 713 (1971). 
242 Bartnicki, 121 S.Ct. at 1762. 
243 See id. at 1764. As noted above, Justice Breyer is also intent on stressing the narrow-
ness of the opinion, although his protest is less than convincing. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 218-19. Rather than merely avoiding the categorical slippery slope that Justice 
Stevens fears, Justice Breyer seems more concerned to limit the "public interest" exception 
lest it "swallow[ 1 up" privacy law. Bartnicki, 121 S. Ct. at 1768. The reference is to Profes-
sor Kalven's observation of state privacy litigation. 
Professor Kalven notes, however, that since Warren and Brandeis championed an ac-
tion against the press for public disclosure of truthful bu·t private details about the individ-
ual which caused emotional upset to him, "it has been agreed that there is a· generous 
privilege to serve the public interest in news .... What is at issue, it seems to me, is whether 
the claim of privilege is not so overpowering as virtually to swallow the tort. What ta1.1.be 
left of the vaunted new right after the claims of privilege have·been confronted?" [Ha'rt.y 1 
Kalven, Qr.,1 Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong? 31 LAw & CoNTEMP. 
PROB. 326, 335-336 (1966). 
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voke O'Brien. But the Court applied an intermediate scrutiny to 
the viewpoint-neutral regulation of pure speech in Turner. Prohib-
iting the disclosure of intercepted conversation would seem to be 
the same type of viewpoint-neutral regulation. 
The third is, I think, the most compelling explanation: the 
right to know simply trumps all privacy interests. That is, privacy 
interest will never prevail when the information is a matter of pub-
lic importance. That has long been the common law rule,244 and it 
follows the logic of previous constitutional libel and privacy cases. 
The right to know limits damages when the speech in question is 
false and defamatory; might it not limit liability itself when the 
speech is true and important? If that is so, then it would seem to 
follow that the right to know ought to have a significant influence 
on the outcome of cases in which truthful and important informa-
tion is sought by the press for the benefit of the public, even where 
the speaker is unwilling to disseminate that information. 
v. WHERE IMPORTANCE SHOULD BE IMPORTANT 
Writing in 1991,245 President Bollinger saw a vital corollary of 
the right to know-the right to gather news-as "the most power-
ful force driving us toward" a new conceptualization of press 
freedom. 246 
The public must know what is happening within official 
quarters, not only to maintain the ability to participate effectively 
but also for the purifying effect public scrutiny has on the decision-
making process (giving rise to the metaphor that sunshine is the 
best disinfectant). A compelling logic in the newsgathering right 
says that the right to speak is meaningless if one has nothing to 
report. 247 
Recognizing a robust newsgathering right, however, will force 
us to face the uncomfortable truth that we really do not trust the 
process ofwide-open public debate with full information, Bollinger 
said.248 It threatens the comfort level we now have in exalting free-
dom of speech and the press, "because we know in our hearts that 
2 44 See, e.g., Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1232 (7th Cir. 1993). 
!d. 
People who do not desire the limelight and do not deliberately choose a way of 
life or course of conduct calculated to thrust them into it nevertheless have no 
legal right to extinguish it if the experiences that have befallen them are news-
worthy, even if they would prefer that those experiences be kept private. 
2 45 Shortly before the newsgathering right was sharply curtailed by the legacy of Cohen v. 
Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991). See Easton, supra note 63. 
24fi Bollinger, supra note113, at 145. 
247 ld. at 146. 
248 See id. at 150. 
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truly harmful situations will rarely arise because we retain the abil-
ity to keep really dangerous information secret."249 Referring pri-
marily to the power of government to withhold its own secrets, 
Bollinger asserted that we rely on "the law of property" to protect 
us from completely uninhibited dissemination of information, 
even as we "claim a contrary self-image."250 
Although Bollinger's primary concern in 1991 was to justifY 
differential regulatory treatment of print and electronic media, he 
was on to something far more important. Recognizing that free-
dom of the press was becoming a struggle between property and 
access, Bollinger saw that concepts such as "'public controversies,' 
newsworthiness, and the fact-opinion distinction" then emerging 
from libel jurisprudence would be important factors on the access 
side of that struggle.251 But Bollinger missed the connection be-
tween these concepts and the public's "right to know," a phrase for 
which he had little use. 
One suspects that Bollinger saw in the notion of a "right to 
know" the ultimate, unqualified triumph of access over property, 
which he was unprepared to accept. If one views the right as mani-
fested by "'public controversies,' newsworthiness, and the fact-
opinion distinction," and therefore qualified by these and similar 
concepts, the right becomes a significant, but not necessarily dis-
positive weight on the side of access. The Supreme Court seems to 
have recognized this principle in the area of personal privacy, and 
it has worked to find the proper balance the only way it can, one 
case at a time. Bartnicki is just the latest case in that search. 
But the Court has not been nearly as receptive to these mani-
festations of the public right to know in three other areas: news 
gathering torts and access to public records, both of which were 
cited by President Bollinger, and copyright. This needs to be 
remedied. 
A. 
I have written elsewhere that the impositiOn of liability for 
newsgathering torts requires some degree of First Amendment 
scrutiny apart from any constraint on the punishment meted out 
for publishing the fruits of such questionable conduct.252 In Bart-
249 /d. at 147. 
250 /d. at 145. 
251 /d. at 151. 
252 See Easton, supra note 63, at 1206-15 (arguing for a constitutional rule protecting 
newsgathering absent bad faith or outrageous behavior). 
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nicki, the Supreme Court neady sidestepped the issue, along with a 
companion case that could have presented it squarely. 
In Peavy v. lW<ftA-Tv, Inc., 253 Carver Dan Peavy was an elected 
trustee who controlled the purchase of insurance for employees of 
a public school district. His incriminating cordless telephone con-
versations were intercepted by a neighbor who, in turn, brought 
tapes of the conversations to WFM-TV.254 Mter consulting outside 
counsel, the station commenced an investigation into suggestions 
of bribery and other wrongdoing that appeared on the tapes.255 
The neighbor was encouraged to provide additional tapes and in-
structed as to the best way to create tapes for broadcast. 256 
Before any broadcast took place, however, counsel told the sta-
tion that its previous advice had been incorrect, that the intercep-
tion was illegal, and that the station ought not accept any more 
tapes, broadcast them, or otherwise use or disclose their con-
tents.257 The station complied with that advice and broadcast three 
reports based on alternative sources.258 The broadcasts did, how-
ever, cover some of the same material that appeared in the 
tapes.259 Peavy was indicted, tried and acquitted on all charges.260 
He subsequently sued WFM-TV, alleging violations of federal and 
state wiretap laws.261 
The district court granted summary judgment for WFM-TV 
on grounds that the station did not procure or obtain the tapes in 
violation of the wiretap laws and that its use and disclosure of their 
contents were protected by the First Amendment under a strict 
scrutiny standard.262 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit va-
cated the summary judgment on the question of whether the sta-
tion procured the tapes in violation of the acts.263 It also summarily 
rejected defendant's apparently half-hearted .First Amendment de-
fense of its newsgathering practices. 264 The court then reversed the 
253 221 F.3d 158 (5th Cir. 2000). 
254 See id. at 164. 
255 See id. at 164-65. 
256 See id. at 164. 
257 See id. at 165-66. 
25B See id. at 166. 
259 See id. 
260 See id. 
261 See id. Specifically of concern here were the questions of whether WFM-TV pro-
cured the tapes in violation of the federal wiretap act, 18 U.S.C. 2511 (1) (a), or the largely 
parallel Texas statute, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 123.002(a)(1); and whether WFM-TV 
used or disclosed the contents of those tapes in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2511 (1) (c) & (d) 
and Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 123.002(a) (2). 
26:.! See Peavy, 221 F.3d at 166-67. 
263 See id. at 194. 
264 See id. at 172. 
In a footnote to their contention there is no "procurement" action, defendants conclusorily 
2003] PUBLIC IMPORTANCE 177 
summary judgment on use and disclosure and, adopting an inter-
mediate scrutiny standard, upheld the statutory provisions against 
the station's as-applied challenge.265 
The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari,266 and the case set-
tled for a reported $5 million. 267 The question of whether and how 
the First Amendment protects a publisher's use and disclosure of 
information obtained illegally by its own reporters will have to wait 
yet another day. 
What was especially troubling about this case was the possibil-
ity that important information might never have been brought to 
the public's attention. Here, the information· concerned appar-
ently unlawful behavior by an elected official in a position of trust. 
Because that information was brought to a television station as the 
result of an illegal interception, the station faced civil and criminal 
liability and, in the end, paid a substantial settlement for using the 
information it learned to develop the story through legitimate 
sources and for disclosing facts to the public that happened to be 
on the intercept tapes, notwithstanding the station's independent 
efforts. 
Even if the courts had ultimately held that the First Amend-
ment protects the publication of important information, whether 
lawfully or unlawfully acquired by the publisher, reporters and edi-
tors may still decline to pursue such stories where, as here, their 
newsgathering practices raise separate grounds for liability. In this 
case, a lawyer, albeit no expert in this field, counseled the station 
"not to accept additional tapes, not to broadcast any tapes, not to 
disclose the contents of the tapes to third parties, and not to con-
front individuals about the conversations on the tapes, unless the 
information was available from other sources. "268 The court would 
later nullify the tiny safe harbor in that final clause,269 and yet still 
assert: "if procurement is construed as broadly as [the Peavys] would have it, the ... provi-
sion also would be unconstitutional as applied ... and on its face." ... Obviously, assuming 
defendants intend this to apply to the "obtains" claim, it is not adequately briefed. In any 
event, it is without merit. Defendants have essentially conceded the First Amendment 
would not bar an action against them for interception. There is no basis for distinguishing, 
for First Amendment purposes, between a person intercepting, on the one hand, and ob-
taining it through someone else, on the other. (Emphasis in original.) 
Id. As a technical matter, the word "procure" is used in the operative provision of the 
federal statute, which, the court held, afforded Peavy no civil damages; "obtain" is used in 
the state statute, which, the court held, did provide for recovery. The court somewhat blurs 
the fact that the Texas statute speaks not of obtaining the intercepted material, but rather 
of obtaining a person to intercept the conversation. 
265 See id. at 194. 
266 See \\'FAA-TV, Inc. v. Peavy, 121 S. Ct. 2181 (2001). 
267 See Belo, Peavy Settle Suit Over Wf/1A Reports, Dallas Morning News 34A (Oct. 19, 2001). 
268 Peavy, 221 F.3d at 165-66 (emphasis in original). 
269 See id. at 174 ("In correctly rejecting defendants' reliance on [attenuation doctrine], 
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declare it "highly unlikely [that the burden the acts impose on 
journalists] will result in 'timidity and self-censorship' .... "270 
If a similar case ever rea~hes the Supreme Court, there may 
yet be an opportunity to reconsider a First Amendment defense for 
the publisher's initial conduct in acquiring the information. The 
only way to ensure that such stories as this one reach the public ear 
is to temper today's misguided rule that newsgathering torts are 
nothing more than "generally applicable laws" that "do not offend 
the First Amendment simply because their enforcement against the 
press has incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the 
news."271 Recognizing the public's right to know serves that pur-
pose well by requiring some heightened degree of First Amend-
ment scrutiny whenever the information in question is a matter of 
legitimate public concern. 
I have previously urged that the First Amendment must pro-
tect tortious and even some criminal conduct in good-faith pursuit 
of a bona fide story, absent outrageous behavior.272 Such conduct 
should be immunized as to public figure plaintiffs or where, as 
here, the defendant is covering government operations.273 While 
the Peavy court properly rejected an "ignorance or mistake of the 
law" defense, based on the journalists' good-faith belief that their 
actions were lawful,274 the journalists acted quite reasonably in 
light of the information they had. Indeed, to have dropped the 
story once they heard the tapes, which the court suggests they were 
bound to do, 275 would have been the greater breach of faith with 
the public. 
At the very least, an ad hoc balancing of interests would have 
dictated a finding of no liability for WFAA-TV and its employees-
provided, that is, that the public's right to know is recognized as a 
legitimate interest. Indeed, such a balancing might be precisely 
what is needed to vindicate the public's interest when important 
information is "owned" by public or private entities. 
the district court stated: 'The fact that [defendant] later obtained the same information 
from independent sources' was irrelevant."). 
270 /d. at 190. 
271 /d. at 185 (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 669 (1972)(emphasis added). 
272 See Easton, Two Wrongs, supra note 63. 
273 See id. Private figure plaintiffs would be limited to compensatory damages absent 
such a showing. 
274 Peavy, 221 F.3d at 178-79. 
275 See id. at 176 (rejecting defendants' contention that, to preserve vital First Amend-
ment interests, the court should construe the proscribed "use" and "disclosure" narrowly to 
exclude exploring leads from lawfully obtained sources). 
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B. 
In the previous section, I argued that the invocation of gener-
ally applicable law requires some degree of First Amendment scru-
tiny when employed against a gatherer of news acting on behalf of 
the public. If there is even a scintilla of validity to that position, 
then surely First Amendment scrutiny is required when a law en-
acted to facilitate the dissemination of information to the public is 
invoked to keep information from the public. This section and the 
next explore the relationship between the right to know and access 
to governmental and privately owned information. 
Few constitutional principles are as well settled or as often re-
peated as the absence of a First Amendment right of access to gov-
ernment information.276 Indeed, President Bollinger paraphrases 
Alexander Bickel, who represented the New York Times in the Pen-
tagon Papers case, to the effect that "it will never be feasible to 
develop a press (or public) right to obtain government-held infor-
mation."277 Bickel reasoned that it would be better to leave the 
government and the press to their own best efforts in protecting 
and pursuing, respectively, important information than to give 
judges the power to compel disclosure and, concomitantly, forbid 
publication. 278 
Justice Potter Stewart perhaps put it best: 
There is no constitutional right to have access to particular gov-
ernment information, or to require openness from the bureau-
cracy. The public's interest in knowing about its government is 
protected by the guarantee of a Free Press, but the protection is 
indirect. The Constitution itself is neither a Freedom of Infor-
mation Act nor an Official Secrets Act. 
The Constitution, in other words, establishes the contest, not 
its resolution. Congress may provide a resolution, at least in some 
276 See, e.g., Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1, 9 (1978) ("This Court has never intimated a 
First Amendment guarantee of a right of access to all sources of information within govern-
ment control."); Saxbe v. Wash. Post, 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974) (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 
417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974): "Newsmen have no constitutional right of access to prisons or 
their inmates beyond that afforded the general public."); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 
665, 684 (1972) ("[T]he First Amendment does not guarantee the press a constitutional 
right of special access to information not available to the public generally."); Zemel v. 
Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965) ("The right to speak and publish does not carry with it the 
unrestrained right to gather information."). But see Nixon v. Warner Communications, 
Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597-600 (1978) (discussing the common law right of access to court 
documents); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (I), 464 U.S. 501, 512 (access to court 
records may be constitutionally required even where the proceeding itself was properly 
closed). 
277 Bollinger, supra note 113, at 148 (paraphrasing ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE MORALI"!Y OF 
CoNSENT 78-86 (1975)). 
278 See id. 
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instances, through carefully drawn legislation. For the rest, we must 
rely, as so often in our system we must, on the tug and pull of the 
political forces in American society.279 
Be that as it may, the government may not ignore the First 
Amendment once it decides to make information available. In 
Saxbe v. Washington Post, 2~:~0 for example, the Court upheld a Bureau 
of Prisons regulation governing media access to federal prisoners 
against a First Amendment challenge precisely because the regula-
tion did not deny the press access to sources available to members 
of the general public.281 Had the regulation barred only creden-
tialed reporters, it would surely have been held unconstitutional as 
singling out the press for special treatment.282 
In a more recent access case, the Supreme Court rejected a 
facial challenge to a California statute regulating access to the ad-
dresses of persons arrested by police.283 The Court pointed out 
that California could have decided not to give out arrestee infor-
mation at all without violating the First Amendment.284 But eight 
justices agreed that the Constitution would limit California's free-
dom to decide how to distribute the information if the state had 
decided to make it available.285 In my view, a "public importance" 
test would be the logical manifestation of any such limitation; it 
remains only to examine how such a test might work in practice. 
Whether the press and public should have access to informa-
tion in the hands of government is unquestionably determined by 
279 Potter Stewart, OrofthePress, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631,636 (1975) (quoted in Houchins, 
438 U.S. at 14-15). 
280 417 u.s. 843 (1974). 
281 !d. at 850. 
282 See, e.g., Minn. Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Commr. Of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 592-
93 (1983) (striking down a state use tax that singled out the press for special treatment). 
See also R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383-84 (1992) (holding that even so-called "unpro-
tected" speech is not "entirely invisible to the Constitution" and may not be regulated in 
ways that otherwise offend First Amendment values). 
283 See Los Angeles Police Dept. v. United Rptg. Publg. Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 34 (1999). 
284 See id. at 40. 
285 See id. at 42-45. Justice Scalia, in a concurring opinion joined by Justice Thomas, 
asserted that a "restriction upon access that allows access to the press (which in effect 
makes the information part of the public domain), but at the same time denies access to 
persons who wish to use the information for certain speech purposes, is in reality a restric-
tion upon speech rather than upon access to government information." !d. at 42. Justice 
Ginsberg, in a concurring opinion joined by Justices O'Connor, Souter and Breyer, agreed 
with Justice Scalia on that point and added: "To be sure, the provision of address informa-
tion is a kind of subsidy to people who wish to speak to or about arrestees, and once a State 
decides to make such a benefit available to the public, there are no doubt limits to its 
freedom to decide how that benefit will be distributed." !d. at 42-43. And Justice Stevens, 
in a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Kennedy, would have held that the statute was 
unconstitutional because it made the information generally available, but denied it to "a 
narrow category of persons solely because they intend to use the information for a constitu-
tionally protected purpose." !d. at 45. 
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statute, and every state and the federal government has enacted 
some kind of open records law. 2M6 To a greater or lesser extent, 
each of those laws contains exceptions to a general disclosure re-
quirement that represent the legislature's determination that some 
other value outweighs the public's interest in the information.287 
When those exceptions involve such values as personal privacy, for 
example, the courts have historically "balanced the public interest 
in disclosure against privacy interests."288 With respect to the fed-
eral Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), however, Professors Hal-
stuk and Davis have shown that "the scope of acceptable public 
interest arguments in favor of disclosure" has been sharply nar-
rowed by an unfortunate distortion of the "central purpose" of the 
act in US. Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the 
Press, 289 in which the Court denied press access to cumulative "rap 
sheets" held by the Justice Department. 
Halstuk and Davis argue persuasively that two factors underlay 
the Supreme Court's retrenchment: a sense that release of comput-
erized databases is qualitatively different from release of the very 
same information one paper record at a time;290 and disapproval of 
the uses to which released records are put, primarily by businesses 
and lawyers. 291 Although enactment of the Electronic Freedom of 
286 See Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Tapping Officials' Secrets, at http:/ 
/www.rcfp.org/tapping/index.cgi (last visited Dec. 8, 2001). State statutes providing for 
public access to government records were enacted as early as 1849, when the Wisconsin 
legislature passed a public records law. See Comments, Public Inspection of State and Municipal 
nxecutive Documents, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. ll05, ll05 (1976). A recent study of state public 
records laws rated Vermont's the best in the country, but gave it only a B-. See Better 
Government Association, Freedom of Information in the USA 6 (forthcoming; draft on file with 
author). 
287 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. 552(b) (1 )-(9) (2001) (listing nine exemptions under the Federal 
Freedom of Information Act [hereinafter FOIA]). 
288 Martin E. Halstuk and Charles N. Davis, The Public Interest Be Damned: Lower Court 
Treatment of the Reporters Committee "Central PU1pose" Reformulation, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 983, 
986 (2002) [hereinafter Halstuk & Davis]. The authors cite U.S. Dept. of the Air Force v. Rose, 
425 U.S. 352, 361 (1972), for the proposition the FOIA exemptions should be "narrowly 
construed" and that "balanced the public and social interest in disclosure against the indi-
vidual's interest in protecting personal privacy against the social value of public disclosure 
must be the device to determine whether information should be disclosed." 
289 489 U.S. 749 (1989). Halstuk and Davis argue that Reporters Committee limits the "pub-
lic interest" side of the balancing equation to information that "directly" addresses govern-
ment operations or activities, not the data collected through those activities, even though 
examining such data might shed even more light, albeit indirectly, on those activities. Hal-
stuk & Davis, supra note 288, at 5-6. 
290 See id. at 40-41 (quoting Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. at 764: "Plainly there is a vast 
difference between the public records that might be found after a diligent search of court-
house files, county archives, and local police stations throughout the country and a com-
puterized summary located in a single clearing house of information."). 
291 See Halstuk & Davis, supra note 288, at 43-45 (noting then:Judge Patricia Wald's ob-
servation that lawyers could find facts faster through FOIA requests than through civil dis-
covery and businesses could use FOIA to get information about their competitors). 
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Information Act (EFOIA) has partly overcome the first of these fac-
tors,292 they conclude that Reporters Committee and its progeny con-
tinue to restrict access to important information held by the 
federal government.293 
According to Halstuk and Davis, form and purpose are imper-
missible grounds for denying access to public records as a matter of 
statutory construction and official policy. A fully developed right 
to know would make denial on those grounds constitutionally im-
permissible as well. I have elsewhere suggested that the First 
Amendment proscribes suppressing information already in the 
public domain by virtue of its form. 294 I submit that suppressing 
information because the person requesting it is a lawyer seeking 
discovery by other means, or an entrepreneur seeking information 
on competitors, or a journalist seeking a news story, is precisely the 
kind of discrimination that the First Amendment right to know for-
bids once government has decided to make the information public 
in one form or another. At the very least, the government's inter-
est in withholding such information must be balanced against the 
public's interest in releasing it, without the artificial constraints im-
posed by Reporters Committee. 
Again, one can find analogous reasoning in public forum doc-
trine. Government is under no compulsion to create a public fo-
rum where none existed by "long tradition."295 If government 
nevertheless chooses to create a public forum, it may "reserve the 
forum for its intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, as 
long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to 
suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the 
speaker's view."2m' But when government creates a public forum 
292 Pub. L. No. 104-231, § 3, 110 Stat. 3049 (1996) (amending 5 U.S.C. 552(£) to include 
electronic records within the definition of "record."). 
293 See Halstuk & Davis, supra note 288, at 46. 
294 See Eric B. Easton, Closing the Bam Door after the Genie is Out of the Bag: Recognizing a 
"Httility Principle" in First Amendmentfurisfmtdence, 45 DEPAUL L. REv. 1 (1995). The argu-
ment that computerized records may be withheld when paper records are available, albeit 
with some etfon, is roughly analogous to the Kam case discussed in this article at 56-63. 
The U.S. Department of State prevented Karn from exporting a cryptographic algorithm 
in digital format, even though it was readily available abroad in text. Although the district 
court upheld the department's ruling against Karn 's First Amendment challenge, see Kam 
v. U.S. Dept. of State, 925 F. Supp. 1, 10-13 (D.D.C. 1996), the administration soon thereafter 
transferred authority over such exports from State to the Department of Commerce, cut-
ting short any substantive review of that holding. See Karn v. U.S. Dept. of State, 1997 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 3123 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 21, 1997) (per curiam opinion remanding the case in light 
of the transfer). Karn's case was dismissed as moot following the transfer. See Phil Karn, 
The AjJplied Cryptography Case: Only Americans Can Type!, at http:/ /people.qualcomm.com/ 
karn/export/ (last visited Dec. 9, 2001). 
295 Perry Educ. Assn. v. Perry Loc. J<.auwtors' Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983). 
296 !d. at 46 (citing U.S. Postal Ser'V. v. Greenburgh Civic Assn., 453 U.S. 114, 129 
(1981)). 
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generally open to the public for expressive purposes, reasonable 
time, place, and manner restrictions may apply, but "a content-
based prohibition must be narrowly drawn to effectuate a compel-
ling state interest."297 Similarly, government may withhold from the 
public information that it alone possesses.298 Or it can enact a law 
releasing the information "for any public or private purpose,"299 
subject only to explicit statutory exceptions. When government 
has done the latter, as ours has, it may not then arbitrarily withhold 
the information, absent some compelling interest that overrides 
the public's interest in seeing the information come to light. 
Whether the Court will reconsider its crabbed interpretation 
of FOIA, as a matter of either statutory construction or constitu-
tional requirement, may become apparent sooner rather than 
later, as two lawsuits begin to work their way through the federal 
courts. On December 5, 2001, the Center for National Security 
Studies and others sought release of information about persons ar-
rested and detained in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist 
attacks.300 The complaint alleges that the Department of Justice's 
failure to release the requested information or even respond in a 
timely manner violates not only FOIA, but also First Amendment 
and common law rights of access. 301 And on November 28, 2001, 
297 Pmy, 460 U.S. at 46 (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1981)). 
298 Although even here, there must be limits. One cannot imagine the government in-
definitely withholding access to, say, presidential papers. Can one? 
299 EFOIA, P.L. 104-231, 2(a)(l), 110 Stat. 3048 (1996): 
(a) Findings. The Congress finds that- (1) the purpose of section 552 of title 5, 
United States Code, popularly known as the Freedom of Information Act, is to 
require agencies of the Federal Government to make certain agency informa-
tion available for public inspection and copying and to establish and enable 
enforcement of the right of any person to obtain access to the records of such 
agencies, subject to statutory exemptions, for any public or jrrivate purpose; (em-
phasis added). 
300 Compl. for lnj. Relief at 12, Ctr. for Natl. Sec. Stud. v. U.S. Dept. of justice, No. 01-2500 
(D.D.C. filed Dec. 5, 2001). In their letters to Justice and the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service, the plaintiffs couched their request for information in terms quoted from 
DOJ's own criteria for expedited processing: 
The 'information is urgently needed to inform the public concerning some 
actual or alleged government activity;' the requesting organizations are prima-
rily engaged in disseminating information to the public; the subject of the de-
tainees 'is of widespread and exceptional media interest and the information 
sought involves possible questions about the government's integrity which at: 
feet public confidence,' and the information is needed immediately to prevent 
"the loss of substantial due process rights" to individuals and 'threats to their 
physical safety.' 
/d. at 8. On Aug. 2, 2002, the court ordered the government to produce a list of the 
identities of all individuals detained in connection with the investigation of the Sept. 11 
terrorist attacks, then granted the Government's motion for a stay pending appeal. Ctr. for 
Natl. Sec. Stud. v. U.S. Dept. of justice, 217 F. Supp. 2d 58 (D.D.C. Aug. 15, 2002) (referring to 
its order at 215 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D.D.C. Aug. 2, 2002)). Oral arguments before the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit were held Nov. 18, 2002. 
301 See id. at 10-12. On Oct. 12, 2001, Atty. Gen. John Ashcroft issued a new statement of 
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the American Historical Association and others sought a declara-
tory judgment setting aside President Bush's executive order gov-
erning the release of presidential documents302 and an injunction 
ordering the release of some 68,000 documents from the Reagan 
Administration. 303 
Neither of these cases puts either the statutory or constitu-
tional questions as squarely as one might wish. The FOIA claim 
implicates national security, as well as personal privacy exemptions; 
the constitutional claim is limited to those "agency records that are 
also court records";304 and the presidential papers case is con-
trolled by another statute altogether. But both cases would afford 
a sympathetic Supreme Court the opportunity to recognize a con-
stitutional right to know and vindicate that right by balancing the 
government's interest in withholding the records against the pub-
lic's interest in disclosure.305 
c. 
Finally, I turn to the right to know information in private 
hands-information protected by copyright or so-called 
paracopyright laws like the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.306 
Our starting point is a recognition that the right to know is already 
an integral part of copyright law. Specifically, the right to know is 
Bush administration policy on FOIA compliance emphasizing that disretionary disclosures 
should be made "only after full and deliberate consideration of the institutional, commer-
cial and privacy interested that could be implicated" and promising that the Justice Depart-
ment will defend agency decisions to withhold records, in whole or in part, unless they 
"lack a sound legal basis." Memo from John Ashcroft, Atty. Gen., to Heads of All Federal 
Departments and Agencies, Freedom of Information Act (Oct. 12, 2001), at http:/ /www.usdoj. 
gov I oip/foiapost/200lfoiapostl9.htm (last visited Dec. 28, 2001). 
302 See Exec. Or. 13233, 66 Fed. Reg. 56025 (Nov. I, 2001) (entitled Further Implementa-
tion of the Presidential Records Act, 44 U.S.C. §§ 2201-07, allowing either a sitting president or 
former president to block the release of the former president's records). 
303 See Com pl. for Decl., Inj., and Mandamus Relief at 22, Am. Hist. Assn. v. Natl. Archives 
and Recs. Admin., No. 01-2447 (D.D.C. filed Nov. 28, 2001). See also Bush Administration keeps 
Reagan Recorcls Under Lock and Key, News Media Update (newsletter of the Reporters Com-
mittee for Freedom of the Press) 3 Quly 23, 2001); Josh Chafetz, The White House Hides 
History, The New Republic (Aug. 27, 2001), at http:/ /www.thenewrepublic.com/082701/ 
chafetz082701.html; Richard Reeves, In War, Truth and History Die First, Universal Press Syndi-
cate (Nov. 16, 2001), at http:/ /www.richardreeves.com. 
304 Com pl. for Inj. Relief at 11-12, Ctr. for Natl. Sec. Stud. v. U.S. Dept. of justice, No. 01-
2500 (D.D.C. filed Dec. 5, 2001). 
305 Quite apart from federal and state open records laws, recognizing a constitutional 
right to know might also release other closely held records in the public interest. Settle-
ments that implicate public health or safety, for example, ought to be in the public do-
main, along with all relevant discovery materials. 
30H See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the .First Amendment Skein, 54 
STAN. L. REv. I, 24 (2001) [hereinafter Netanel] (defining "paracopyright" as technology-
or contract-based protections against unauthorized access or use of digital content, such as 
those afforded by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 
2860 (1998)). 
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advanced by several limitations on and exceptions to copyright law 
that allow it to coexist with the First Amendment:307 the fact-ex-
pression dichotomy,308 the first sale doctrine,309 the fair use de-
fense,310 compulsory licensing,311 and the limitations on purpose 
and duration contained in the constitution's intellectual property 
clause.312 Together, these arguably satisfy whatever public impor-
tance test might be required by the First Amendment right to 
know, and copyright might just as well have been discussed with 
307 Netanel calls this notion the "Nimmer Exoneration." /d. at 7-12 (citing Melville B. 
Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 
UCLA L. REv. 1180 (1970), and noting the distortion of Nimmer's analysis by courts in 
holding that copyright does not implicate the First Amendment). 
308 The Copyright Act of 1976 provides that "Copyright protection subsists ... in original 
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression," 17 U.S.C. § 102 (a), but 
"[i]n no case does copyright protection ... extend to any idea ... embodied in such work." 
17 U.S.C. § 102 (b). See, e.g., Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 
350 ("As applied to a factual compilation, assuming the absence of original written expres-
sion, only the compiler's selection and arrangement may be protected; the raw facts may 
be copied at will."); Harper & Row Pub!., Inc. v. The Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 
(1985) ("First Amendment protections [are] already embodied in the Copyright Act's dis-
tinction between copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable facts and ideas .... "). 
309 "[T]he owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or 
any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright 
owner, to sell or. otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord." 17 
U.S.C. 109(a). See, e.g., Amer. Inti. Pictures, Inc. v. Foreman, 576 F.2d 661, 664 (5th Cir. 
1978) ("The exclusive right to vend a copy of a copyrighted work extends only to the first 
sale of that copy. Mter the first sale of a copy the copyright holder has no control over the 
occurrence or conditions of further sales of it." (citation omitted)). The free lending li-
brary, for example, depends in part on the first sale doctrine to immunize its operations 
from liability for copyright infringement. See generally Laura N. Gasaway, Values Conflict in 
the Digital Environment: Librarians versus Copyrightholders, 24 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTs 115 
(2000). 
310 "[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work ... for purposes such as criticism, comment, 
news reporting, teaching ... , scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright." 
17 U.S.C. § 107. See, e.g., Consumers Union of the U.S., Inc. v. Gen. Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 
1044, 1050 (2d Cir. 1983) ("The scope of [fair use] is undoubtedly wider when the infor-
mation conveyed relates to matters of high public concern."). But see Harper & Row, 471 
U.S. at 559 ("It is fundamentally at odds with the scheme of copyright to accord lesser 
rights in those works that are of greatest importance to the public."). 
311 See 17 U.S.C. 111 (secondary transmissions of broadcast signals), 115 (making and 
distributing phonorecords), 116 (jukeboxes), 118 (noncommercial broadcasting). Com-
pulsory licenses represent an attempt to accommodate the monopoly rights of authors and 
inventors under copyright and patent law with other social needs or political choices. See, 
e.g., Theodore C. Bailey, Student Author, Innovation and Access: The Role of Compulsory Li-
censing in the Development and Distribution of HN/AIDS Drugs, 2001 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & PoL-
ICY 193, 217 (concluding that compulsory licensing of HIV I AlDS drugs in developing 
countries contributes to a socially optimal balance between discovery and distribution). 
But see Salah Basalamah, Compulsory Licensing for Translation: An Instrument of Develop-
ment?, 40 IDEA 503 (2000) (advocating an international fair use regime for less developed 
countries to replace the current compulsory license for translation). 
312 U.S. Const. art. I, 8 ("The Congress shall have Power. .. [t]o promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclu-
sive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries .... "). Courts have explicitly re-
jected the assertion that the language in this clause imposes any substantive limitation on 
congressional authority to set copyright teqns and conditions. See, e.g., Schnapper v. Foley, 
667 F.2d 102, 112 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
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libel and privacy law in Part IV of this article to demonstrate that 
the public importance test is alive and well. 
Alive, perhaps, but not so well these days. All of these safe-
guards are currently under assault in Congress and the courts.:>~':>~ A 
growing number of important books, articles, and amicus briefs at-
test to the concern within the academic community that the pro-
tections accorded privately held information have expanded 
beyond tolerable levels under the First Amendment.:>~ 14 As those 
protections expand, the body of information in the public domain 
is diminished, rather than enhanced as the framers envisioned.315 
So far, however, most courts have been reluctant to look beyond 
the statute to see the constitutional significance of this erosion in 
the right to know.316 Even where courts have applied a First 
Amendment analysis, the results have perpetuated the power of the 
copyright holders.317 
:'113 See, e.g., the "Sonny Bono" Copyright Term Extension Act [hereinafter CTEA], Pub. 
L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (extending the copyright term by 20 years); the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act [hereinafter DMCA], Pub, L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 
(1998) (generally prohibiting the circumvention of technology used to prevent access to or 
copying of works protected by copyright, as well as the trafficking in circumvention tech-
nology); Collection of Information Antipiracy Act, H.R.2652, 105th Cong. (1998) 
(database protection legislation passed by the House but dropped from the Conference 
Report on the DMCA). The CTEA was upheld against a First Amendment challenge in 
Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001) affd, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003), while the DMCA 
survived a constitutional assault in Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 
25330 (2d Cir. Nov. 28, 2001). 
314 See, e.g., JESSICA LITMAN, Digital Cojryright 14 (Prometheus Books 2001) ("If current 
trends continue unabated ... we are likely to experience a violent collision between our 
expectations of freedom of expression and the enhanced copyright law."); Br. of Amicus 
Curiae, American Civil Liberties Union et al., Universal City Studios, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 
25330; see also infra text accompanying notes 315, 319-23. 
315 See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, F'ree ns the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on 
Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 354, 354-55 (1999) (Although the First 
Amendment requires a "robust" public domain, "our society is making a series of decisions 
that will subject more of the ways in which each of us uses information to someone else's 
exclusive control."). 
:'llfi Netanel points out that Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 252 F.3d 1165 (llth 
Cir. 200 I) (vacating an injunction barring publication of the parody The Wind Done Gone as 
an unlawful prior restraint) marked the first time that an appellate court had applied the 
First Amendment's Press Clause to constrain enforcement of a copyright. See Netanel, supra 
note 306, at 2. 
317 In Universal City Studios, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 25330, the court acknowledged that 
the computer code embodying the DVD decryption algorithm DeCSS was "speech" within 
the meaning of the First Amendment, but found that the ii~junction issued under the 
DMCA to bar the defendants from posting the algorithm on their web sites or linking to 
other web sites carrying the algorithm implicated non-speech, functional component.~ of 
the algorithm, in the case of posting, and the hyperlink, in the case of linking. Having 
established that the injunction was content-neutral, the court then held that it survived the 
heightened scrutiny test of Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994). 
A California appellate court reached a different result, however, when the recording 
industry tried to enjoin the posting of DeCSS under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, Civ. 
Code § 3426.1 et seq. In DVD Cojry Control Assn. v. Bunner, 2001 Cal. App. LEXIS 1 l 79 (6th 
App. Dist. Nov. 1, 2001), the court held that the lower court's injunction against future 
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Proposed remedies for this erosion have included denying 
copyright to newsworthy works,318 providing heightened First 
Amendment scrutiny for copyright regulation,319 limiting prelimi-
nary injunctions against copyright infringers, 320 reformulating the 
fair use doctrine to give greater weight to speech than to market 
concerns,321 creating an independent First Amendment privilege 
beyond fair use,322 even permitting abandonment of copyright alto-
gether in favor of technological self-help.323 Any of these alterna-
tives would reinvigorate the right to know with respect to 
copyright, although most would operate in practice as defenses to 
an infringement or circumvention complaint and, therefore, re-
quire an actor willing to risk liability for making a mistake (the 
dreaded "chilling effect"). 
For certain works in which the public interest is especially 
high, I would have Congress provide a "condemnation" proceed-
ing,324 initiated by the government or a private actor, who would 
disclosure of DeCSS was an unconstitutional prior restraint and that Bunner's First Amend-
ment rights trumped DVDCCA's statutory right to protect its trade secrets. /d. at 32-34. 
The court cited copyright law's constitutional pedigree and statutory safety valves to distin-
guished it from the trade secret statute at issue here. 
318 See, e.g., Los Angeles News Serv. v. Tullo, 973 F.2d 791, 795 (1992) ("[Defendant] 
contends that ... we should adopt a bright-line rule that no videotape of a newsworthy 
event is copyrightable because its creator's proprietary interest must give way to the pub-
lic's First Amendment right of access to information."). 
319 See, e.g., Netanel, supra note 306, at 54 ("[C]opyright law constitutes content-neutral 
speech regulation that should be subject to heightened (Turner), but not strict, scrutiny."). 
320 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellec-
tual Property Cases, 48 DuKE LJ. 147, 210 (1998) (asserting that preliminary injunctions 
should be permitted only in cases involving literal copying). 
321 See, e.g., Ruth Okediji, Givers, Takers and Other Kinds of Users: A Fair Use Doctrine for 
Cyberspace, 53 FLA. L. REv. 107, 113 (2001) ("[A]s owners' rights are expanded to respond 
to the ease with which digital technology enables large scale infringement, users' rights 
should, correspondingly, be reconceived to reflect the variety of ways the Internet facili-
tates-indeed encourages-production, access, and use of copyrighted content."); L. Ray 
Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright & Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REv. l, 61 ( 1987) (a rational fair use 
doctrine would distinguish the impermissible use of a copyright by a competitor from the 
protected use of the underlying work by a consumer). 
322 See, e.g., Stephen Fraser, The Conflict Between the First Amendment and Copyright Law and 
its Impact on the Internet, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. LJ. l, 51-52 (advocating an independent 
First Amendment privilege, outside the scope of fair use, based on factors such as a public 
interest in the copyrighted work and the necessity for access to it); HenryS. Hoberman, 
Copyright and the First Amendment: Freedom or Monopoly of Expression, 14 PEPP. L. REv. 5 71 , 
(1987) ("The first amendment should protect unconsented use of copyrighted material 
when the alleged infringer can show (1) necessity, (2) originality, and (3) advancement of 
first amendment interests."). 
323 See, e.g., Tom W. Bell, &cape from Copyright: Market Success vs. Statutory Failure in the 
Protection of I<.xpressive Wm"ks, 69 U. CINN. L. REv. 741 (2001) (asserting that copyright own-
ers should have the right to choose between the rights accorded by federal copyright law 
and technological self-help measures and accompanying common law protections);julie E. 
Cohen, Copyright and Thejwisprudence of Self-Help, 13 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 1089, 1141 (1998) 
(advocating a right to hack digital code that prevents users from exercising those copyright 
privileges required by the First Amendment). 
324 The term "condemnation," of course, is a real property concept, but I use it here 
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seek a declaration that the public importance of the work is so 
great that some rights must be taken from the copyright owner and 
dedicated to the public.32;; Obviously, there is a legitimate public 
interest in much of the copyrightable work in private hands, and 
any or all of the remedies suggested above could be employed to 
ensure that copyright protection does not impair the public's ac-
cess to it. Under my proposal, only works of extraordinary impor-
tance to the public could be condemned at taxpayer expense, 
among them perhaps the famous Zapruder film of President Ken-
nedy's assassination.326 
Another such work is Dr. Martin Luther King's "I Have a 
Dream" speech, delivered at the Lincoln Memorial during the civil 
rights leader's Aug. 28, 1963, March on Washington.327 Dr. King 
applied for a statutory copyright about a month later, then success-
fully pursued an injunction against the sale of unauthorized re-
cordings of the speech.328 More than 30 years later, CBS produced 
a documentary containing about sixty percent of the speech.329 
The King estate, which owned the copyright, sued, but the district 
court granted CBS's motion for summary judgment on the ground 
that, under the 1909 Copyright Act, the work entered the public 
domain by virtue of its "general publication" on Aug. 28, 1963.330 
The court of appeals reversed, remanding the cause for a trial on 
whether a general publication in fact occurred.331 Neither court 
reached the fair use issue, and the case was settled in July 2000.332 
only to suggest that the device I propose resembles the familiar "taking" of private property 
for public use with just compensation. I do not mean to imply any closer similarity be-
tween copyright and rights in real property. 
32fi Professor Litman has written that seasoned copyright experts could not agree 
whether it is even possible to dedicate works to the pubic domain after the Berne Imple-
mentation Act, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988). See Litman, supra note 314, at 
76 n.10. 
3 2fi See Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis A~soc., 293 F. Supp. 130, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). When 
Time, Inc., used considerable parts of the Zapruder film without permission, the court 
found the use was fair. But the "fair use" defense is hardly a reliable safeguard when mar-
ket value is weighed more heavily than public importance. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 
566. 
327 The text of the speech is widely available. See, e.g., The Douglass Archives of Ameri-
can Public Address, at http:/ /douglass.speech.nwu.edu/king_bl2.htm (last visited Dec. 
17, 2001). 
328 See Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 194 F.3d 1211, 1213 (11th Cir. 
1999). 
32\l See id. 
330 /d. at 1213-14. 
33l See id. at 1220. 
332 On july 12, 2000, The Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for Nonviolent Social Change 
issued a press release announcing terms of the settlement. CBS News would "retain the 
right to use its footage of the speeches," and would "also have the right to license its foot-
age to others while providing contact information, as appropriate, regarding the Estate's 
claimed intellectual property rights." The release went on to say that CBS would provide 
2003] PUBLIC IMPORTANCE 189 
No one can deny the vital importance of this speech, and espe-
cially film of this speech, to the public. It represents a pivotal mo-
ment in twentieth century American social and political history. 
Yet, short of misuse,333 there is no mechanism under the 1976 Act 
for a copyright to enter the public domain before expiration unless 
it is dedicated to the public by the copyright owner.334 The so-
called "fact-expression" dichotomy affords no relief; no mere 
description of this speech, nor even its text, could adequately con-
vey all or even a substantial portion of the "information" the public 
requires.335 The sight, the sound, the setting-all of these are our 
history. Moreover, nothing less than the full speech will do, negat-
ing any possibility that fair use will suffice.336 While some form of 
compulsory license might give the film some circulation, control 
would remain in the hands of those who could afford the license 
fee rather than the public at large.337 Finally, any concern that the 
film would be put to some less-than-enlightened uses might be 
ameliorated by allowing the author's estate to retain a quasi-moral 
right to preserve the integrity of the work.338 
If condemnation seems a narrow and problematic reform, it is 
footage of the speeches for use by the King Estate and would make a contribution to the 
King Center. Available at http:/ /wwww.thekingcenter.org/tkc/press_release/07-12-2000. 
htm (last visited Dec. 17, 2001). 
333 Misuse of copyright is an equitable defense to an infringement action based on the 
plaintiff's attempt to leverage its copyright to acquire an exclusive right or limited monop-
oly beyond those afforded by copyright law. See, e.g., Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 
911 F.2d 970, 978 (4th Cir. 1990). While the effect of misuse is suspension of the plaintiffs 
capacity to bring an infringement action, plaintiff can purge itself of the misuse and re-
cover all of its copyright rights. /d. at 979, n.22. 
334 Under the 1909 Act, which governed Dr. King's copyright, a "general publication" of 
the speech might have precluded protection as a literary work and thrust the speech into 
the public domain. That issue was actually litigated the same year in King v. Mister Maestro, 
Inc., 224 F. Supp. 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), with the court holding that Dr. King's public deliv-
ery of the speech and his providing the press with an advance copy of the text did not 
constitute a general publication. In the CBS case, the district court explicitly and substan-
tively disagreed with that decision: "As one of the most public and most widely dissemi-
nated speeches in history, it could be the poster child for general publication." Estate of 
Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 13 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1353 (N.D. Ga. 1998). 
33.~ See Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guaranties of Free 
Speech and the Press?, 17 UCLA L. REv. 1180, 1197 (1970) ("It would be intolerable if the 
public's comprehension of.the full meaning of My Lai could be censored by the copyright 
owner of the photographs."): 
33fi See Harper & Row, 471 U,$. at 565-66 (holding that taking even a relatively small 
portion of the original work can' negate the fair use defense). 
337 Hoberman considers compulsory licenses a "tax on free speech" that is repugnant to 
First Amendment values. See Hoberman, supra note 322, at 593-94. 
33!l This is not the place to go into whether the right of integrity exists. in the United 
States. For a discussion on the various copyright law provisions, common law protections, 
and court decisions that may satisfY the Berne Convention, see H.R. Rpt. 100-609, at 32-34 
(1988). In any event, the King Estate has already alienated some of Dr. King's former 
associates by licensing the film for use in an Alcatel commercial. See Controversy Over Use of 
King Name, promoting a segment on the Dec. 2, 2001, edition of CBS's 60 Minutes, at http:/ 
/www.cbsnews.com/now/story/0,1597,319500-412,00.shtrnl (last visited Dec. 13, 2001). 
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at least a step toward unwinding the constraints within which copy-
right is enclosing the informational commons.339 
Coupled with some of the other reforms suggested above, the 
taking of copyright in the public interest will help expand the 
amount of important information in the public domain and re-
duce the control exercised by an increasingly concentrated media 
industry. 340 
Indeed, it may come to pass that some limitation of copyright 
may play a role in preventing further consolidation of the media 
industry, if not rolling back such consolidation as has already oc-
curred. Antitrust scholars are already looking at the media indus-
try as a potential target for intervention,341 but, in my view, they 
face serious First Amendment obstacles. This is not to say that the 
media industry is immune from antitrust action to block mergers 
or break up monopolies; the case law clearly shows otherwise.342 
Where the rationale for antitrust action is economic, the First 
Amendment has nothing to say. But where the rationale for anti-
trust action is the same as the rationale for direct government regu-
lation-the need to preserve some minimal number of voices in 
the marketplace of ideas-the First Amendment stands as an insur-
mountable barrier. Any such action that requires the government 
to inquire into the substance, as well as the number, of messages 
reaching the public would, in my view, invoke strict scrutiny. 
But, to the extent that consolidation of the media industry is a 
function of copyright protection (as Professor Benkler has ar-
gued343), it might be slowed or rolled back by selective curtailment 
of copyright, without First Amendment implications.344 Because 
the grant of copyright is, itself, a privileged exception to the First 
Amendment, the withdrawal of one or more exclusive rights or 
shortening of the copyright term when the protected matter is of 
public importance, cannot but advance First Amendment interests. 
Although the Copyright Office takes no notice of a work before 
copyright "subsists," and conducts only a modest review for 
339 See Benkler, sufJra note 315, at 354-55. 
~140 See id. at 410 ("(I]ncreases in copyright protection .... is likely to lead, over time, to 
concentration of a greater portion of the information production function in society in the 
hands of large commercial organizations that vertically integrate new production with 
owned-information inventory management."). 
341 See, e.g., Lande, supra note 170. 
342 See supra text accompanying note 149. 
343 See supra text accompanying note 340. 
3 44 But see David McGowan, Innovation, Uncertainty, and Stability in Antitrust Law, 16 
BERK~:LEY TECH. LJ. 729 (2001) (arguing against making the exercise of legitimate IP rights 
the basis for antitrust action, absent abuse such as conditional refusal to license which 
expands the rights-owner's power beyond that granted by Congress). 
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copyrightability before registration, nothing in the constitutional 
authority given to Congress requires such forbearance. Copyright 
examinations could be made as exhaustive as patent examinations 
if Congress wished it so.345 Thus, inquiry into the substance of 
messages withheld from the public domain by copyright poses no 
further intrusion on the First Amendment than the copyright privi-
lege itsel£.346 
As a practical matter, the inquiry that I suggest into the public 
importance of a protected work would occur only after a condem-
nation claim has been filed. Congress might designate the Register 
of Copyrights to conduct the inquiry and impose an appropriate 
disposition: withdrawal of copyright, with or without compensa-
tion, reduction of term, or some limitation on exclusive rights. 347 
Any such action would be appealable to the courts. 
The scope of this proposal is limited indeed; it offers no an-
swer to private control of information of less than surpassing im-
portance. That would require a sweeping reevaluation of the 
relationship between copyright and mass-audience news in general. 
I believe such a reevaluation could lead to the public's recovering 
most of the exclusive copyright rights to journalistic work product 
in exchange for rights of integrity and attribution.348 If one as-
sumes that today's media giants participate in the hard news enter-
prise solely for prestige and legitimacy, such a "bargain" should 
create incentives to produce more (at least not less) newsworthy 
345 The distinction between copyrights and patents in this regard is generally attributed 
to absence of a novelty requirement in copyright law. Authors are free to create new works 
that precisely match pre-existing works, so long as the first work is not copied and the 
match is purely coincidental. See, e.g., ARTHUR R. MILLER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTI' LAW, 
PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHT, IN A NuTSHELL 399 (West 3d ed. 2000). But this 
distinction is a practical one created by Congress; the constitutional charge is identical as 
to both kinds of intellectual property. 
346 One might argue that giving government the opportunity to reward or penalize an 
author by a grant or denial of copyright protection, based on the content of the work, is 
impermissible under the First Amendment. Yet that is precisely the nature of "fair use," so 
the power is already woven into the fabric of the copyright law. Where prior restraint is the 
status quo ante, one cannot say that any relief violates freedom of speech because it is 
incomplete. 
347 In particular, the right to make derivative works could be dedicated to the public 
with little harm to the copyright owner and great benefit to the public. See, e.g., Eric B. 
Easton, Annotating the News: Mitigating the njfects of Media Convergence and Consolidation, 23 
UALR L. REv. 143, 148-50 (2000) (arguing that annotating news stories should not be 
considered infringement of the copyright owner's exclusive right to make derivative 
works). 
!148 I have only begun to work through this theme, but, at the inoment, I believe that the 
reproduction right should be preserved for compilations and other collective works; other-
wise, the rights to reproduce and distribute a single news story, to make annotations and 
other derivative works, and to perform or display the work publicly would all be dedicated 
to the public domain. In return, the. "author" would be guaranteed prominent attribution 
and some protection from distortion (although not criticism). 
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information and to disseminate it more widely. 349 To the extent 
that profitability matters, that could be accommodated by structur-
ing the transaction in the nature of a compulsory license for, say, 
the first 24 hours. 
Of course, that raises all sorts of questions about defining jour-
nalism and other publicly important information, but those ques-
tions are already being raised.350 That the New York Times and The 
Washington Post have become "private copyright cops,"351 control-
ling how their stories may be used (or abused), is anathema to any 
meaningful notion of a free press. Only when the public's right to 
know is given full effect through the application of a public impor-
tance test, may copyright law actually achieve the purpose intended 
by the framers-to be the "engine of free expression."352 
VI. SECOND THOUGHTS 
The thesis of this article-that a penumbral First Amendment 
right to know is manifest in a public importance test that ( 1) is 
routinely applied by the courts in some areas and (2) ought to be 
applied more rigorously in others-raises at least two troublesome 
issues. The first is whether deference to proprietary interests such 
as personal privacy, government secrecy, and copyright is neces-
sary, as a practical matter, to preserve core freedoms of speech and 
publishing; the second, whether investing in courts the power to 
determine what is publicly important undermines both the prerog-
atives of the political branches and the independence of journal-
ists. As noted above, the first of these comes from Alexander Bickel 
349 Legendary CBS Chairman William Paley supposedly once explained why he contin-
ued to invest in money-losing hard-news coverage: "I hate losing the money, but I like what 
it buys me in respectability and licensing protection." Jane Mayer, Bad News, THE NEw 
YORKER, Aug. 14, 2000, at 30, 35, quoted in David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEx. 
L. REV. 429, 454 n.126 (2002). 
350 As this article was being finished, Professor David Anderson published an important 
new article that deserves far more attention than can be given here. Professor Anderson 
argues that the Press Clause of the First Amendment, as distinct from the Speech Clause, 
must be invoked if we are to preserve those legal preferences enjoyed by what we have 
traditionally viewed as "the press." See Anderson, supra note 349, at 528. Doing so, how-
ever, requires us to distinguish between the broadly defined provision of information -
accomplished by any number of economic actors in this information age - and the func-
tions traditionally performed by journalists. See id. at 448-49. That, in turn, requires con-
tent discrimination based on importance. See id. at 530. Professor Anderson notes that such 
discrimination has been with us since the "beginning of the republic," albeit masked by 
proxies such as format, frequency and means of distribution, and essentially denied in First 
Amendment theory. !d. at 528-29. Although I remain uncomfortable with Professor An-
derson's suggestion that such discrimination be undertaken by all levels and branches of 
government, /d. at 528, I embrace his sense of the importance of public importance. 
351 SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND CoPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL PROP-
ERTY AND How IT THREATENS CREATIVITY 188 (2001). 
352 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558. 
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by way of President Bollinger;353 the second from Justices Harlan 
and Marshall.354 But they are two sides of the same coin: trust. 
Bollinger believes we, the people, cannot be trusted with really 
important information and, what is more, do not want to be bur-
dened with it. As the right to gather news becomes stronger, he 
wrote, 
we are being forced to confront the disconcerting fact that 
much information in this or any society is better left unspoken, 
often because of a legitimate distrust of the process of public 
discussion. As this occurs, we will come to discover that the law 
of property is relied upon to protect us from completely 'unin-
hibited' and 'wide-open' dissemination of information, while we 
claim a contrary self-image.355 
A decade later, Professor Sunstein would take Bollinger's dis-
trust of the public to yet another level-for the Internet age.356 
Faced with a nearly infinite array of information choices, Sunstein 
writes, we will gravitate toward those that reflect our own views and 
concerns and filter out those with which we disagree or in which 
we have little interest. Left to our own devices, we will splinter into 
enclaves of like-minded people, deprive ourselves of new or chal-
lenging information, and forgo the shared experiences that are so 
vital to our democracy. The more consumer freedom we exercise, 
the more political freedom we lose.357 
Sunstein believes that we can save ourselves from this fate by 
putting our consumer preferences aside and, as responsible citi-
zens acting through our government, force ourselves to take the 
medicine we need. While this can be done voluntarily, there is no 
reason to fear regulation. Mter all, what we mistakenly think of as 
freedom of the press is really only a system of property allocations 
enforced by law and regulation at taxpayer expense. So it is really 
quite a small matter to adjust those property rights into a configur-
ation that better serves our democracy.358 
If Bollinger and Sunstein are right, Madison must have been 
wrong, and the First Amendment should be rewritten to authorize 
Congress to make whatever laws may be necessary to ensure that 
government can protect the people from their own weaknesses and 
the media companies that would exploit those weaknesses for 
353 See supra text accompanying notes 277-78. 
354 See supra text accompanying note 1. 
355 Bollinger, supra note 113, at 145. 
35n See Sunstein, supra note 140. 
357 See id. at 44-50. 
358 See id. at 128-131. 
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profit. But was it not Congress that created the system of property 
allocations that brought us to this sorry state of affairs? If Professor 
Litman's brief history of copyright law is any indication, we the 
people will be the last to benefit when and if Congress reallocates 
those property rights.~r'9 
If not Congress, then who? The dissenting opinions in Rosen-
bloom presaged the consensus in Gertz that courts should stay out of 
it. Justice Harlan's observation is quoted above;~60 herewith, Jus-
tice Marshall's: 
In order for particular defamation to come within the privilege 
there must be a determination that the event was of legitimate 
public interest. That determination will have to be made by 
courts generally and, in the last analysis, by this Court in particu-
lar. Courts, including this one, are not anointed with any ex-
traordinary prescience. But, assuming that ... courts are not 
simply to take a poll to determine whether a substantial portion 
of the population is interested or concerned in a subject, courts 
will be required to somehow pass on the legitimacy of interest in 
a particular event or subject; what information is relevant to self-
government. The danger such a doctrine portends for freedom of the 
press seems apparent. 361 
But is the danger really so apparent? Intuitively, Justice Mar-
shall's concern rings true. No journalist wants to be second-guessed 
by a judge as to which stories are newsworthy and which are not. 
As a practical matter, though, the worst case scenario looks a lot 
like the situation that exists today. By construing public impor-
tance narrowly, courts could subject journalists to greater risk of 
liability in private facts cases and greater damages in private plain-
tiff libel cases. By construing public importance narrowly, courts 
could reduce the likelihood of a fair use defense to copyright in-
fringement. By construing public importance narrowly, courts 
could decline to excuse news gathering torts or to pry information 
from government agencies. How is that dangerous? 
Recognizing a constitutional right to know would put more 
public importance decisions in the hands of judges. But it is diffi-
cult to see how judges, even in the worst case, could constrict the 
flow of information to the public beyond today's baseline. In any 
event, there is no reasonable alternative. 
359 Litman, sujmt note 314, at 63. 
360 See supra text accompanying note 186. 
3GI Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 79 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
